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If rtsked to explain extradition, most U.S. lawyers-and indeed many judges and legal 
scholars-will give only the most rudimentary answers. They may fumble in response 
saying that it is a procedure for sending criminals back to their home states or nations or, if 
current with the news, for bringing narcotics traffickers from Latin America to the United 
States for prosecution. But the details are likely to be bluny, and the lawyer can be excused 
for conflating extradition with deportation proceedings.' This is not surprising, since few 
attorneys are ever involved in an extradition proceeding, especially an international one, and 
few legal scholars are familiar with the issues. Even counsel who deal regularly with 
immigration and deportation matters rarely deal with extradition, and they may be unaware 
of its unusual elements. Should the question of extradition arise, the accused typically seeks 
a criminal lawyer, since many of the elements of an extradition proceeding appear criminal 
in nature-arrest, arraignment, incarceration, and bail. But even most criminal defense 
lawyers must turn to the library to determine the scope of the process and the rights of the 
person held for extradition. Their research reveals that many rules that normally govern 
criminal proceedings do not apply, that some of our most cherished constitutional 
protections may be limited or denied, and that even international norms of human rights may 
be ignored. 
From the outset of an extradition process in which the United States is the asylum 
nation, the extraditee is at a disadvantage in challenging the request.2 As with most criminal 
cases, he may have no idea that he is wanted on a criminal charge until he is arrested. Like 
other detainees, he will likely have to scramble to find defense counsel or, depending upon 
his financial situation, may have to rely on appointed counsel. The odds of finding 
counsel--either appointed or retained-who is knowledgeable about extradition 
proceedings are slight. 
On the other side of the proceeding is the government, usually represented by an 
Assistant U.S. Attorney and perhaps an official from the U.S. Department of Justice's 
Criminal Division in Washington, who has likely filed a substantial memorandum with the 
extradition complaint.3 The law seems unfavorable for the accused because, as common 
wisdom suggests, as long as the requesting country's papers are in order, the judge has little 
leeway to examine the government's evidence or motivation and, thus, must order 
e~t radi t ion .~  Extradition cases, however, often never reach a judge because counsel, 
1. Extradition in the international setting is the process by which "one sovereign surrenders to another 
sovereign a person sought as an accused criminal or a hgitive offender." M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL 
EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL 
EXTRADITION]; see also GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 17 (1 991); 6 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, 
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 727 (1968). International extradition does not apply to a person who has not 
been charged, but is merely wanted for questioning. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra, at 227. 
The return of individuals from one state of the United States to another, typically called interstate rendition, is 
assured by Article 4, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. It differs considerably from international extraditions. 
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL 9-15.100 (2001), at 
http:/lwww.usdoj.gov/usaoleousa~foia~readingoousatile9/tit1e9.htm. International extradition is not 
addressed in the Constitution [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL]. Id. 
2. In an extradition proceeding the party whose extradition is requested is generally referred to as the relator. 
For convenience's sake, this article usually uses the more descriptive terms extraditee, detainee, or accused. See, 
e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL AW, CASES AND MATERIALS 286-87 (1 996). 
3. The Criminal Division's Office of International Affairs (OIA) is responsible for foreign extradition 
matters. It provides assistance and support to the ofices of U.S. attorneys in handling foreign extradition issues. 
See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 1, 3 9-15.210 (2001). For a description of the functions of the OM, 
see Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Evolution of United States Involvement in the International Rendition of Fugitive 
Crimitzals, 25 N.Y.U. J .  INT'L L. & POL. 8 13,8 18-20 (1 993). 
4. The legal standard to be applied is examined infra Part 1II.B. 
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inexperienced with extradition matters, concludes that the client should not fight extradition 
but, instead, should waive his right to a hearing and agree to be deported to the requesting 
country. 
If the client decides to contest extradition, the next unpleasant surprise may be that 
prehearing release is difficult to secure-even if there is little risk of flight. The extradition 
judge may be lenient in allowing the government to demonstrate probable cause to support 
the detention and may be reluctant to grant bail to a person the government labels a 
fugitive.5 If the arrest was provisional, as most are, the client may be incarcerated for many 
weeks without speedy trial guarantees or establishment of bail while the governments gather 
the appropriate documents. Incarceration can be especially onerous if the attorney does not 
speak the language of the requesting nation, making it difficult to obtain information since 
his client is not readily available for consultation and trans~ation.~ 
Extradition has a long, indeed ancient, history, and many of its tenets evolved over 
time to meet the needs of nations as they developed their external relations. But as 
intercourse between states has expanded and changed and as interest in protecting human 
rights has come to the fore, the rules that control international extraditions appear 
increasingly antiquated.' As U.S. courts have struggled without clear guidance to apply the 
hoary principles enunciated in early case law, the difficulties they encounter in conforming 
rulings to the dictates of extradition law, the constraints of the U.S. Constitution, and 
international precepts of human rights are patent. Although courts and scholars have 
addressed a number of these matters in recent years, their conclusions have not been 
uniform. Many vexing issues remain: the standards for prehearing release, the degree of 
proof required before an individual can be returned to his home country to face prosecution 
or incarceration, and the consideration given to the legal and political conditions in the 
requesting nation. Of special importance is the extent to which an accused may challenge 
the evidence presented by the prosecutors and present evidence of his own. Especially 
problematic is the issue of presenting evidence to contradict that of the government or to 
demonstrate improper motivation on the part of the requesting nation. While there are valid 
reasons for many of the current rules and restrictions, they can, nonetheless, seriously erode 
individual protections and, either individually or as a whole, violate human rights standards. 
The conflicts between outmoded concepts of extradition law and contemporary 
notions of human rights are becoming increasingly important as the volume of extraditions 
increases.* This increase in extraditions appears to result in large part from exponential 
increases in global commerce and travel coupled with the globalization of crime and 
criminal organizations. Nations now struggle not only with illegal financial schemes and 
cyber crimes, but with international terrorism, narcotics and weapons trafficking, and money 
laundering.9 As the ease of travel has increased, as well as emigration, more and more 
5. See infra Part V.B, V.F. 
6. The court may provide a translator at the extradition hearing, but in the author's experience securing 
translation services for the client in jail can seriously complicate the process. 
7. These rules are generally drawn from treaties and from federal statutes. PAUST, ET AL., supra note 2, at 
95; see infra Part 111. 
8. The State Department and the Department of Justice review hundreds of requests for extradition each 
year. See Lis Wiehl, Extradition Law at the Crossroads: The Trend Towards Extending Greater Constitutional 
Procedural Protections to Fugitives Fighting Extradition from the United States, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 729, 792 
(1998). 
9 .  See Bruce Zagaris, Constructing a Hemispheric Initiative Against Transnational Crime, 19 FORDHAM 
INT'L L.J. 1888, 1890 (1996). A report recently released by the National Security Council sees a growing threat to 
national security from increasingly sophisticated networks of international criminals who exploit expanded trade 
and information opportunities in their criminal schemes. NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL CRIME THREAT 
ASSESSMENT (2000), available at http://clinton4.nara,gov/WWEOP/NSC/html/documents/pub45270/ 
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individuals find themselves in situations where their conduct may give rise to foreign 
criminal charges and extradition requests, even if they have never set foot in the requesting 
nation.'' In addition, civil unrest and corruption in some countries appear to have forced 
emigration by many individuals and raised the specter of politically motivated 
prosecutions." Thus, both the nature of global interactions and the nature of the matters 
forming the basis for many extradition requests have changed. 
In spite of the need to scrutinize extradition requests, the matter has, for the most part, 
evaded public attention. In rare cases an extradition matter may achieve news media 
coverage, but by and large there has been little notice given to these types of proceedings. 
In part, that may be because they often occur very quickly, and the individual sought may 
have few resources to hire counsel and to otherwise fight the claim. In addition, the stigma 
attached to an individual, especially a foreigner, against whom criminal charges have been 
lodged may make him an unlikely recipient of sympathy from the press and public. This 
negative perception may be especially likely to occur if the case involves narcotics and the 
individual comes from a country that has a reputation for that activity. However, the courts 
have shown an increasing willingness in some cases to scrutinize the evidence presented by 
the government in the extradition hearing,12 to inquire into the political and human rights 
conditions in the requesting state,13 and to allow release prior to the formal extradition 
hearing.I4 This trend recognizes the growing dissonance between nineteenth-century 
extradition processes and twenty-first-century conceptions of human rights. 
This article was prompted when a well-regarded LL.M. candidate at Pace Law 
School's Center for Environmental Legal Studies was arrested and subjected to extradition 
proceedings. Faculty, staff, and students became embroiled in efforts, ultimately successful, 
to challenge the extradition request. In doing so, they confronted the substantive and 
procedural barriers faced by an accused in current extradition processes and the significant 
potential for human rights abuses. Thus, this article, which analyzes current extradition law, 
updates what has been a slowly developing area of the law and proposes changes to address 
some of the shortfalls. Part I1 presents a brief history of extradition law, focusing on both 
the national and international conditions that prevailed when the law developed as well as 
the ensuing changes in those conditions and laws. Part I11 explains contemporary 
extradition law and practice, while Part IV explores the statutory, judicial, constitutional, 
pub45270index.html. The report contends that organized crime has become diversified internationally, and there 
are often links between criminals and political elites in home countries. The report' cites crimes ranging from 
trafficking in women and children to copyright and trademark pirating and computer hacking. See id. (noting in 
Chapter 1 that in 1999 roughly 480 million people entered the United States). 
10. In the case of many contemporary crimes, an individual need not be present in a country to commit a 
punishable offense. The ability to prosecute an individual who has committed acts abroad intending for the 
offense to be consummated in the requesting state is especially important in combating those who export and 
traffic in narcotics. See President's Letter of Transmittal Extradition Treaty with the Republic of Colombia, Sept. 
14, 1979, U.S.-Colombia, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 97-98 (1981) [hereinafter US.-Colombia Extradition Treaty]. 
11. See, e.g., Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Sikhs claim political motivations by 
Indian government; contend that evidence was fabricated); It1 re Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d 419, 429,430-31 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (Hutu charged with genocide in Rwanda claims government pressure lead to false evidence; tribal 
retribution); Maguna-Celays v. Haro, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (Basque separatist argues 
confessions coerced). 
12. See, e.g., In re Gonzalez, 52 F .  Supp. 2d 725, 738-41 (W.D. La. 1999) (court admitted alibi witnesses). 
13. Courts have traditionally followed a rule of "non-inquiry" when questioning conditions in the requesting 
country. See infra Part V.G. For a summary of the recent scholarship examining the rule of non-inquiry, see 
Richard J. Wilson, Toward the Enforcement of Universal Human Rights Through Abrogation ofthe Rule ofNon- 
Inquiry in Extradition, 3 ILSA J .  INT'L & COMP. L. 751, 751-52 nn. 1-2 (1997) [hereinafter Non-Inquity]. 
14. See, e.g., Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997); Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 430 F. Supp. 915, 
917 (D. Mass. 1977), rev'd, 553 F.2d 92 (1st Cir. 1977), vacated, 554 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1977) (reviewing recent 
bail cases); see also John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extrudition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1448 
(1998) (stating that bail decisions are "all over the lot"). 
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and international human rights issues related to a party's attempt to resist extradition. Part 
V focuses on one case, In re Extradition of Victor Manuel ~ a f u r - ~ o r n i n ~ u e z , ' ~  to illustrate 
the substantive and procedural issues in current practice and argues that some of the 
limitations typically placed on the individual are unfair, unwise, unconstitutional, and, even 
if individually supportable, may in the aggregate violate international human rights norms. 
Part VI concludes with suggestions for changes to U.S. extradition law and practices that 
would comport with modern conceptions of individual rights and liberties. 
11. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXTRADITION PROCESS 
While we might be inclined to think of extradition as a legal process developed by 
modem nation-states, it has ancient origins. The first reported extradition agreement was in 
a peace treaty about 1280 B.C.E. between an Egyptian pharaoh and a Hittite prince for the 
exchange of prisoners of war.16 While there is little record in the intervening centuries, it 
appears that until the 1700s nations typically sought individuals for political and religious 
offenses.17 For roughly the next 150 years, military offenders appeared to be the primary 
focus of international extradition efforts,'' with nations mainly concerned about the 
repatriation of soldiers after international conflicts.I9 As trade increased among nations, the 
focus of extraditions changed in order to adequately respond to burgeoning commerce. 
From the mid-1800s until after the Second World War, the focus seemed to shift to the 
apprehension and rendition of common criminals.20 In the late nineteenth century, bilateral 
extradition treaties became more common as countries sought to regularize the rendition of 
 individual^.^' It was then at the end of that century that the primary form and rationale for 
current extradition procedures were formulated. 
Early in the history of the United States, extraditions were purely a function of the 
executive, carried out without judicial participation. The first U.S. extradition agreement 
was included in the Jay Treaty with Great Britain in 1794." While this Treaty made no 
reference to the judiciary, providing that the respective ministers or officers should 
surrender the party sought by the requesting nation, it did require evidence of  criminality 
15. In re Extradition of Victor Manuel Tafur-Dominguez, No. 00-154-M (E.D. Pa. 2000). 
16. IVAN A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION m INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1971); Allison Marston, Innocents Abroad: 
An Analysis of the Constitutionality of the International Extradition Statute, 33 STAN. J .  INT'L L. 343, 346-48 
(1997); see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, TERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 2-3 (1974) 
[hereinafter BASSIOUNI, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER]. 
17. See BASSIOUNI, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 16, at 4. Ordinary criminals were, however, subjects 
of extradition. Henry I1 of England and William the Lion, King of Scotland appear to have entered into the first 
formal agreement for the return of common criminals in 1174 CE. See JOHN B. MOORE, A TREATISE ON 
EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 10 (1891). For the most part the arrangements seem to have been 
informal and ad hoc. Extradition was not limited to Europe during this period, since the Chinese engaged in 
extradition with neighboring countries. BASSIOUNI, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 16, at 1.  
18. See BASSIOUNI, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 16, at 4. 
19. See generally BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 1, at 3 n.9. 
20. See BASSIOLINI, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 16, at 4. 
21. Both common law and civil code countries entered into extradition treaties, and although the forms 
differed somewhat, they were essentially similar. See BASSOUNI, NTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 1, at 
11. A major difference is that common law countries typically require that the requesting state demonstrate 
probable cause to believe that the offense at issue was actually committed. Civil law countries typically consider 
the warrant itself sufficient to demonstrate aprima facie case. See BASSIOUNI, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 
16, at 508; see also Kai I. Rebane, Note, Extradition :and Individual Rights: The Need for an International 
Criminal Court to Safeguard Individual Rights, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1636, 165 1 (1996). 
22. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-U.K., art. 27, 8 Stat. 1 16, 129. 
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sufficient to meet the standards of the asylum state.23 Although judicial action was not 
contemplated by the Treaty, when Britain sought the surrender of an individual for trial on 
mutiny charges, Jonathan Robbins, who claimed to be an American c i t i~en, '~  President John 
Adams asked for a judicial opinion. The court found sufficient evidence to support the 
charge and Robbins was extradited to Britain where he was tried and hung.25 The resulting 
uproar in the United States, based in part on the mistaken premise that Adams had ordered 
the court to surrender Robbins, was such that President Adams was forced to defend his 
actions. The controversy ultimately figured in his election defeat. Another extradition 
treaty was not negotiated until 1842, and it included provisions for judicial determination of 
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the request.26 Shortly thereafter, Congress 
enacted the first statute governing extradition; this statute provided for judicial review of the 
extradition request, but left the ultimate decision to the executive." Although the statute has 
been amended since that time, it remains substantially similar to the one enacted over a 
century and a half ago. Thus, we see that, while changes have occurred in the intervening 
years, practices in effect today were largely defined when sailing ships still plied the 
ocean. 28 
By contrast, international views of individual human rights have evolved rapidly 
during the last century-especially after World War I1 and the establishment of the United 
~ a t i o n s . ~ '  Where once the sovereign rights of nations were paramount and a country's 
request to obtain an individual to stand trial or serve a sentence was given great weight, 
contemporary society has a distinctly different view. International treaties, conventions and 
covenants, and many nations' constitutions have recognized the importance of individual 
rights and may be in conflict with extradition procedures and processes.30 
Extradition is the formal process by which an individual, the extraditee, is rendered 
from the asylum state where he is located to the requesting state in order to face prosecution 
or, if already convicted, to serve a sentence. Extradition is typically carried out pursuant to 
a treaty, usually bilateral, and some say that without a valid treaty there can be no 
e~tradition.~' That statement, however, is not accurate, since states may choose to ignore 
-- -- 
23. See id. 
24. It was later determined that he was Irish. See Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of 
Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229,304 (1990). 
25. See id. 
26. Treaty to Settle and Define the Boundaries between the Territories of the United States and the 
Possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in North America, Aug. 9, 1842, U.S.-U.K., art. 10, 8 Stat. 572, 576. 
27. The first extradition statute was enacted in 1848. Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167, 9 Stat. 302. Although 
it has been modernized, the current provisions are essentially the same as the 1848 statute. Benjamin N. Bedrick, 
Comment, United States Extradition Process: Changes in Law to Address Constitutional Infirmity, 15 DICK. J. 
INT'L L. 385,396 (1997) (discussing the arguments made by the State Department in Loube v. Christopher, 893 F. 
Supp. 65,67 (D.D.C. 1995)); Marston, supra note 16, at 347. 
28. See John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1442 (1988) 
(discussing additional history on extradition). See generally Rebane, supra note 21, at 1644-48; Jonathan 0 .  
Hafen, International Extradition: Issues Arising Under the Dual Criminality Requirement, 1992 BYU L. REV. 
191, 192-94. 
29. BASSIOLJNI, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 16, at 4-5. 
30. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1980). "Eighteen nations have incorporated 
the Universal Declaration into their own constitutions." Id. (citing 48 REWE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 
Nos. 3 & 4, at 21 1 (1977)). See infra Part IV. 
31. United States law provides that the surrender of individuals is allowed only if a treaty is in force with the 
requesting nation. See 18 U.S.C. 5 3181 (1994). Limited exceptions for crimes of violence against U.S. citizens 
in another country were added on April 24, 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. N, subtit. D, 5 (a), 110 Stat. 
1280. 
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the lack of a valid treaty32 and enter into ad hoc agreements. In any case, other mechanisms 
exist that can achieve the transfer of individuals between nations. Mutual legal assistance 
pacts,33 informal rendition,34 deportation,35 and even kidnapping36 have been employed 
toward this end.37 
A. The Extradition Treaty 
Although it is the U.S. Department of State that negotiates an extradition treaty, 
consent to its ratification must be given by the U.S. Senate. Over time the United States has 
entered into treaties with many countries and has from time to time modified them. It is 
currently party to over 100 bilateral and multilateral extradition agreements.38 While the 
treaties may differ in detail, they are substantially similar in overall structure. In general, an 
extradition treaty spells out the specific crimes covered and requires reciprocity on the part 
of the signatories.39 Treaties typically require the issuance of a formal request of 
extradition, backed by evidence regarding the identity of the person and the nature of the 
offense, through the diplomatic channels of the state seeking e~tradition.~' The offense 
must be one that is provided for in the treaty; it must also be an offense in the asylum 
country.41 A treaty will frequently also require that, once extradited, the requesting country 
32. Colombia, for example, abrogated the U.S.-Colombia Extradition Treaty, see lgor I. Kavas, Colombia: 
Supreme Court Decision on Law Concerning the Extradition Treaty Between Colombia and the United States, 27 
I.L.M. 492, 495-96 (1988), but used emergency procedures to extradite drug dealers to the United States. See 
Motion of Amici Curiae for Leave to File a Memorandum of Law in Support of Relator, In re Tafur-Dominguez, 
No. 00-154-M (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7,2000) at 13-16 [hereinafter Amici Memorandum of Law]. 
33. See Craig S. Smith, Asylum Plea by Chinese Sect's Leader Perplexes the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 
2000, at A3 (noting the lack of an extradition treaty with China and signing of a mutual legal assistance pact 
intended to provide a framework for return of criminals by either side). 
34. Informal rendition occurs outside of a treaty. See BASSOUNI, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 16, at 
128-29. For a description of U.S. involvement in informal rendition, including abduction, see Nadelmann, supra 
note 3. 
35. See, e.g., Ruiz-Massieu v. Reno, 91 F.3d 416, 418 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Non-Inquiry, supra note 13, 
at 752 n. I. Recently the United States sought several Bosnian citizens of Algerian origin accused of participating 
in the World Trade Center attack in New York City on September 11, 2001. Rather than pursue extradition, the 
Bosnian government stripped these individuals of their citizenship and turned them over to the United States. Ian 
Fischer, Quaeda Suspect S Bosnian Wife Says He's No Terrorist, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,2002, at A3. , 
36. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); Bruce Zagaris, Extradition, Evidence 
Gathering, and Their Relatives in the Twenty-First Century: A U.S. Defense Counsel Perspective, 23 FORDHAM 
INT'L L.J. 1403 (2000). Commentators have argued that customary international law does not permit abductions. 
See id. at 1435 n.62; Rebane, supra note 21, at 1647; Jonathan A. Cluck, Note, The Customary International Law 
of State-Sponsored International Abduction and United States Courts, 44 DUKE L.J. 612, 614 (1994); Brigette 
Belton Homrig, Comment, Abduction as an Alternative to Extradition-A Dangerous Method to Obtain 
Jurisdiction Over Criminal Defendants, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671,672,702-03 (1993). 
37. See Darin A. Bifani, The Tension Between Policy Objectives and Individual Rights: Rethinking 
Extradition and Extraterritorial Abduction Jurisprudence, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 627, 638 n.63 (1 993). 
38. U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY I, 2000 (2000); see also 18 U.S.C.A. 4 3 18 1. 
39. However, some of the more recent treaties eschew the listing of crimes and instead limit extradition to 
crimes punishable by more than one year in prison, and rely on the rule of dual criminality. See infra note 41; see, 
e.g., Treaty of Extradition, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227 (entered into force Jan. 21, 1977). 
40. The requesting country typically submits an extradition request through its embassy to the Department of 
State, which transmits it to the U.S. Department of Justice. The hearings are prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney for 
the district where the requested party is found. See U.S. AT~ORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 1, 9 9-15.700. See 
generally Wiehl, supra note 8, at 73 1 n.2. 
41. This is referred to as the "dual criminality requirement." BASSIOUNI, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 
16, at 313. It is not necessary that the crimes be identical, but the facts must support a charge in both the 
requesting and the asylum state. See id. at 326-27. The requirement of dual criminality is so universally accepted 
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will not prosecute an individual for crimes other than those specified in the extradition 
request.42 The treaty usually provides that the extradition will proceed "pursuant to the laws 
of the requested state."43 Thus, the evidence presented by the requesting nation must be 
sufficient to meet the applicable standards of the asylum state. For requests made to the 
United States, the federal standard of probable cause must be met.44 The question of the 
extent of proof needed to support the detention is a controversial one.45 Many of the treaties 
also allow provisional detention of the e~traditee~~-sometimes for as long as ninety 
days4'-while formal papers are submitted. 
B. The Extradition Process 
Under U.S. law federal judges and as well as state judges, are given 
authority to hear extradition cases.49 Such a hearing is a limited one, often analogized to a 
preliminary hearing in a criminal case. If the judge finds that the legal requirements have 
been met,50 he issues a certificate of extraditability to the secretary of state, who then makes 
that it may be customary international law. See SHEARER, supra note 16, at 138; Homrig, supra note 36, at 675. 
For a definition of customary international law, see infra note 113. 
42. This is referred to as the "specialty requirement." The specialty doctrine may be held applicable even if 
it is not mentioned in the extradition treaty. See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419-20 (1886); 
see John B. Quigley, The Rule of Nan-Inquiry and the Impact of Human Rights on Extradirion Law, 15 N.C. J. 
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 401, 429-31 (1990). Of course, the extraditing state has no means, other than diplomatic 
entreaties, to enforce the specialty provision. Rebane, supra note 21, at 1653. 
43. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty with the Republic of Colombia, Sept. 14, 1979, U.S.-Colom., art. 9, S. 
TREAW DOC. NO. 97-8, (entered into force Mar. 4, 1982) [hereinafter U.S.-Colombia Extradition Treaty]. 
44. While the treaties usually specify that the standards of the requested state must be met, if the treaty is 
silent on the issue, U.S. courts have nonetheless required that probable cause be found. See In re Extradition of 
Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1217 (5th Cir. 1986); see also infra notes 50,68,69, 189, 191,234. 
45. Traditionally, the government was allowed to present only the sketchiest of evidence, and some courts 
went so far as to hold that for provisional arrest, the existence of a foreign warrant from a competent authority was 
sufficient; see WHITEMAN, supra note 1, at 93 1; see also BASSIOUNI, NTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 
1, at 718 (quoting In re Shapiro, 352 F. Supp. 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)); Wiehl, supra note 8, at 751 n.72; see, e.g., 
Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1980) (lower court issued arrest warrant based on U.S. 
government's allegation of existence of foreign warrant). The U.S.-Colombia Extradition Treaty, which was the 
basis for the extradition attempt of Mr. Tafur, contained these basic conditions. However, the situation was 
complicated by the strange history of treaties with Colombia. See infra notes 187-88. 
46. Treaties typically allow provisional detention in cases of "urgency" when it is likely that the requested 
party is a fugitive and will flee before the formal request through diplomatic channels, which may take weeks to 
prepare, can be completed. Wiehl, supra note 8, at 73 1 n.2. See, e.g., U.S.-Colombia Extradition Treaty, supra 
note 43, art. 11. The majority of warrants in extradition cases are provisional. Wiehl, supra note 8, at 734 n.7. 
47. See, e.g., Convention Regarding the Reciprocal Extradition of Criminals, Jan. 31, 1930, U.S.-Aus., art. 
XI, 106 L.N.T.S. 379. In fact, the delay in obtaining an extradition hearing routinely exceeds three months. 
Wiehl, supra note 8, at 75 1. 
48. U.S. magistrates are judicial ofticers appointed by U.S. district court judges in the respective districts to 
assist them in certain proceedings and are not judges appointed pursuant to Article TI1 of the U.S. Constitution. 
Their appointment, tenure, and jurisdiction is spelled out in 28 U.S.C; $5 631, 636 (2001). The role of the 
extradition magistrate is established by 18 U.S.C. 5 3184 (2001). Whether it is a U.S. magistrate or a U.S. district 
judge who is the presiding judicial officer at an extradition hearing, he is generally referred to as an "extradition 
magistrate." See Jacques Semmelman, The Rule of Nan-Contradiction in International Extradition Proceedings: 
A Proposed Approach to the Admission of Exculpatory Evidence, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1295, 1295 n.4 (2000) 
[hereinafter Nan-Contradiction]; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Ahmad: Profile of an Exrradition Case, 23 N.Y.U. J. 
INT'L L. &POL. 723, 732 11.28 (1991). 
49. Although state judges are authorized by statute to hear extradition requests, it does not appear to be a 
common occurrence. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 129-30 n.11 (2d Cir. 1981); Wiehl, supra note 8, at 731 
n.2. 
50. These requirements are whether a valid treaty exists, whether the crime is one covered by the treaty, 
whether there is reason to believe that the accused is the person sought, and there is probable cause to believe the 
accused committed the crime. See 18 U.S.C. 5 3184 (1994). 
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the final, formal determination whether to extradite. The decision of the court as to 
extraditability may not be appealed by either the accused or the government.s' The accused 
may, however, seek habeas corpus review, although the scope of that review is r e ~ t r i c t e d . ~ ~  
While the government may not seek review of an adverse decision, it may resubmit the 
extradition request,53 even. numerous times;54 the government is not barred by concerns of 
double jeopardyS5 or due process.s6 
C. Competing Interests of Foreign Policy and Comity and the Criminal Justice System 
Extradition is an exercise in foreign policy-including all of the complications that it 
entails. A nation has a sovereign interest in preserving and protecting its jurisdiction over 
events that happen within its territory. It is interested in making sure that its own laws are 
obeyed and has a substantial interest in assuring that offenders cannot escape punishment by 
traveling beyond its national boundarie~.'~ To protect this jurisdiction a country must have 
some ability to secure the return of those who have violated its laws.58 Thus, it is in a 
nation's interest to cooperate with other nations that also wish to assure that violators within 
their territories are not beyond the reach of their own laws. This mutual need for 
accommodation is reinforced by general principles of comity and international cooperation. 
Efforts to accommodate a treaty partner requesting extradition, and to do so in an 
expeditious fashion, can lead to conflicts between the requested state's extradition 
51. A magistrate's decision to certify the accused for extradition is not an appealable final order. Caplan v. 
Vokes, 649 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1981); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES 5 478 cmt. c (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The decision to certify is to be tested through 
application for the writ of habeas corpus. Castro Bobadilla v. Reno, 826 F. Supp. 1428, 1431 (S.D. Fla. 1993), 
aff'd without op. ,  28 F.3d 116 (I l th Cir. 1994). 
52. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 5 1, 5 478 reporters' note 2 (1 987). 
53. See Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426,429-30 (1923); united States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491,492-93 (2d 
Cir. 1986). In re Mahmoud Abed Atta, aMa1 "Mahmoud el-Abed Ahmad," 706 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), 
was an original extradition hearing before a federal magistrate. When the request was denied, the govemment 
filed a second request, which was heard by a U.S. district judge, sitting as a magistrate, who conducted a hearing 
de novo. Lowenfeld, supra note 48, at 732-33. The effect of this was the same as having an appeal to a higher 
authority. Id. at 733. When the judge granted the extradition request, Ahmad filed for habeas corpus, which was 
heard by another district court judge. Id. at 735-36. 
54. See Ruiz-Massieu v. Reno, 91 F.3d 416, 418 (3d Cir. 1996). The government attempted four times to 
extradite Ruiz-Massieu unsuccessfully, then sought deportation. He committed suicide after being charged in the 
United States with money laundering. See Mark Stevenson, Associated Press, Ruiz Massieu Kills Himselfin New 
Jersey (Sept. 15, 1999), http://www.eco.utexas.edu/-archive/chiapas95/1999.09/msg0023O.html. 
55. See Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1365, 1367 n.7 (9th Cir. 1978). This is apparently because there 
has not been a determination as to guilt. Lowenfeld, supra note 48, at 732 n.27 (analogizing to a second effort by 
a prosecutor to seek an indictment); see also Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. at 429-30; Artukovic v. Rison, 784 F.2d 
1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1986). 
56. Merino v. United States Marshall, 326 F.2d 5, 13 (9th Cir. 1963) (stating that due process and fair 
hearing are "not applicable . . . in an international extradition case"). 
57. In responding to a request from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy concerning extradition, Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk pointed out the practicalities, writing that "[tlhe manner in which this Government interprets and 
executes an extradition agreement with a, foreign country will doubtless affect the treatment given extradition 
requests the United States makes to that country." ~ e t t e r  from Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary of State, to Rob& 
Kennedy, U.S. Anorney General (Apr. 20, 1961), reprinted in 6 WHITEMAN, supra note 1, at 999-1000; see also 
Bedrick, supra note 27, at 390 11.35; Marston, supra note 16, at 347 n.23. 
58. "Enforcement of our own laws . . . is the governmental interest served by extradition treaties." Parretti v. 
United States, 122 F.3d 758, 780 (9th Cir. 1997). The concurring judge in Parreiti took a broader view, 
suggesting that the interest served was larger than domestic law enforcement. "It is important to the nation's 
overall ability to work effectively in the international arena that it be thought of as a country that keeps its 
commitments." Id. at 786 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
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procedures and its general criminal laws and constitutional provisions, which may require 
higher levels of proof or greater attention to individual rights than are conducive to rapid 
extradition processes. In the United ~tates'well-developed criminal jurisprudence59 requires 
that an individual normally be accorded such minimal procedures as a demonstration of 
probable cause before incarceration, the opportunity for bail during the pendency of the 
proceedings, and a speedy judicial resolution of the charges. These requirements may 
complicate the extradition process, but foreign policy considerations make expedition and 
simplicity important. Unfortunately, it may be the individual's rights that are sacrificed to 
political expediency.60 
D. The Nature of the Proceeding 
An extradition proceeding is sometimes called sui generis,6' since it purportedly is not 
criminal in nature,62 but it obviously does not fit neatly into the civil mold.63 But any 
extraditee who has been subjected to arrest and imprisonment and who has been brought to 
the courtroom in handcuffs to face lawyers from the Department of Justice's Criminal 
Division can attest that the process has all the attributes of a criminal proceeding. Yet the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically do not apply,64 nor do the Federal Rules of 
~ v i d e n c e . ~ ~  The judge is then often left to rely on case law, much of which predates both 
current societal problems and contemporary notions of human rights. 
In addition to approving extradition treaties, Congress also establishes the role of the 
court and the measures necessary for controlling the extradition proceeding. Thus, 
extradition hearings are authorized by federal statute.66 These hearings are often analogized 
to a preliminary hearing in a domestic criminal case, and it is to those proceedings that the 
courts look for guidance.67 But extradition standards are less stringent. While probable 
cause must be demonstrated before extradition will be approved,68 the government's proof 
not only may be based on hearsay, but can be presented in documentary form without live 
witnesses. Many of our constitutional protections do not apply-including ~ o u r t h , ~ ~  ~ifth," 
59. The jurisprudence continues to develop. See generally Thirteenth Annual Review of Criminal 
Procedure, 89 CEO. L.J. 1045 (2001). 
60. Commentators have long suggested that the executive might be less-than-thorough and objective in 
reviewing evidence of guilt when policy considerations are at stake. See Marston, supra note 16, at 364. 
61. See, e.g., Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1976); Bedrick, supra note 27, at 403; U.S. 
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 1, at Criminal Resource Manual 5 614. 
62. Romeo v. Roache, 820 F.2d 540,543-44 (1st Cir. 1987). 
63. See, e.g., Jhirad, 536 F.2d at 482. 
64. FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(b)(5). 
65. The.Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 1101 states that: "Extradition and rendition 
proceedings are governed in detail by statute. 18 U.S.C. $8  3181-195. They are essentially administrative in 
character. Traditionally the rules of evidence have not applied. 1 Wigmore 5 4(6)." FED. R. EVID. 1101, 
advisory committee's note. 
66. 18 U.S.C. 4 3184 (1994) provides statutory authority for an extradition hearing when a valid treaty 
exists. 
67. The courts have Frequently held that extradition hearings are in the nature of a preliminary hearing in 
which the judge must determine if there is probable cause that justifies the holding of an accused to answer for a 
charge. Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 460 (1913); Sayne v. 
Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 685 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970); In re Extradition of Gunther 
Lehming, 951 F. Supp. 505, 513-14 @. Del. 1996); Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. 777, 781 
(N.D. Cal. 1985). 
68. The government does not disagree that probable cause must be shown in order to extradite, but has 
argued that to detain an accused on a provisional warrant the existence of a foreign arrest warrant is sufficient. 
That argument was rejected in Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 770-71 (9th Cir. 1997). 
69. The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment prohibits searches and seizures except "upon probable 
cause." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Although the probable cause standard must be met at the extradition hearing, 
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~ i x t h , ~ '  and ~ i ~ h t h ~ ~  Amendment privileges.73 Discovery is generally not available,74 and in 
attempting to defend against a case, the accused is traditionally limited in the nature of the 
evidence that may be presented in defense, since the courts allow only evidence that may 
explain, not contradict, the government's evidence. As the courts have recognized, the line 
between explanatory and contradictory evidence is less than distinct7' Finally, courts are 
usually in unfamiliar territory when dealing with foreign crimes and criminal systems and 
may be reluctant to venture too far in a matter with potential foreign-policy implications. 
E. The Role of the State Department 
Since extradition is both historically and currently a matter of foreign policy, the U.S. 
Department of State plays a key role. As noted earlier, it is the State Department that 
negotiates extradition treaties with other nations and ultimately decides whether rendition 
will be granted. It receives the formal requests,76 which are handled by the Office of the 
courts traditionally did not require a demonstration of probable cause for a provisional detention. In Parretri, a 
federal court for the first time held that the government must meet the same standard of probable cause under the 
Fourth Amendment for an extradition detention as in a federal criminal case. For an examination of some of the 
early jurisprudence on the issue of probable cause, especially whether testimony or affidavits were required to 
support the arrest warrant, see generally Wiehl, supra note 8, at 734 n.lO. In Parretti, the court went further and 
ruled that the government would have to prove that the extraditee posed a risk of flight before he could be 
detained pending a hearing. Parretti, 122 F.3d at 778-82. The court based this on Fifth Amendment 
considerations. Id. at 780. At the time of the Parretti decision, the government and some commentators 
suggested that it would hamper the government's efforts to detain and extradite fugitives, as well as to obtain the 
return of individuals whom it wished to prosecute and to negotiate new treaties. See, e.g., Wiehl, supra note 8, at 
738-39 nn.24-25, 27. Whether that has in fact been the case is not apparent. In addition to the probable cause 
issue, courts may refuse to apply the exclusionary rule. See Romeo v. Roache, 820 F.2d 540 (1st Cir. 1987); 
Simmons v. Braun, 627 F.2d 635,637 (2d Cir. 1980). 
70. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 461-62 (no right to cross-examine); Oen Yin-Choy v. Robinson, 858 
F.2d 1400, 1406-07 (9th Cir. 1988) (no right to cross-examine); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 817 n.41 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (no statutory basis for ordering discovery); Messina v. United States, 728 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(no right to cross-examine). The Fifth Amendment right to due process may also be violated by detention of an 
individual who poses no risk of flight. See Wiehl, supra note 8, at 762. In addition to due process, the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits placing an individual twice in jeopardy for the same crime. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
71. Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1976) (no guarantee of speedy trial); Freedman v. United 
States, 437 F. Supp. 1252, 1265 (N.D. Ga. 1977). The Sixth Amendment guarantees rights to speedy and public 
trial, to confront witnesses, and to have compulsory process to obtain witnesses for the defense. U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI. 
72. The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. Vm. 
73. See generally Bifani, supra note 37, at 641-61. 
74. Messina v. United States, 728 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1984) (no right to cross-examine); In re Singh, 123 
F.R.D. 108 (D.N.J. 1987). But see Emami v. U.S. Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 834 F.2d 1444, 1452 
(9th Cir. 1987) (court has discretion to grant or deny discovery; should not convert to dress rehearsal for trial); 
Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 817 n.41 (9th Cir. 1986) (court may order as justice requires); Wright v. 
Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903); United States v. Messina, 566 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). In typical preliminary 
hearing the defense has at least some opportunity for discovery of the government's case. 
75. See infra Part V.G. 
76. Initial requests for extradition typically come in the form of a letter, cable, or sometimes even a phone 
call asking that a party be arrested and held "provisionally" while the requesting nation prepares the formal 
extradition request. For example, in Parretti v. United States, the French government requested Parretti's 
provisional arrest via diplomatic note to the State Deparhnent. Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 
1997). Facts to support the warrant before the magistrate were provided to U.S. officials "in an informal way." 
Id. at 762. This "package" may be voluminous, and its contents dictated by the extradition treaty at issue. It 
typically contains charging documents, summaries of testimony, affidavits, certified translations, and the requisite 
ambassadorial certifications and judicial certifications. See Wiehl, supra note 8, at 731 n.2. 
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Legal ~ d v i s e r . ~ ~  These formal requests are reviewed to make sure that the proper 
documentation has been provided and forwarded to the U.S. Department of Justice. While 
it would not be accurate to say that the State Department makes no assessment of the 
sufficiency of the charges, that role is left primarily to the Justice Department. Although 
State Department officials may well be concerned about the rights of individuals sought by 
another country, there may be a natural tendency to try to accommodate a nation with which 
the United States wishes to maintain cordial relations. Thus, the political tenor of the 
relationship may have an effect on the State Department's actions in an extradition 
proceeding, and, as noted previously, the danger exists that individual rights may give way 
to political  interest^.^' Although the State Department has the choice to refuse to e~tradite,~' 
even after a court has issued a certificate of extraditability, refusal is an exceedingly rare 
o c c u r r e n ~ e . ~ ~  The decision of the secretary of state is final and is not subject to judicial 
review.'' 
F. The Role of the Justice Department 
It is the U.S. Justice Department that assumes the primary role in complying with the 
extradition request. When the Justice Department receives the referral from the State 
Department, it reviews the referral to determine whether it meets substantive legal 
requirements and then arranges for an extradition complaint to be filed in a U.S. district 
court and an arrest warrant to be issued. In most cases the matter is referred to the 
appropriate U.S. Attorney's Office, which drafts the complaint and the warrant 
application-generally using a form complaints2-and secures issuance of the warrant by a 
77. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note I, at Criminal Resource Manual 5 612. 
78. See Bedrick, supra note 27, at 394 (stating that the secretary may decide to extradite based on policy 
considerations). This may be reinforced by the courts that may view treaties as protective of state, rather than 
individual, interests. Rebane, supra note 21, at 1656; Bifani, supra note 37, at 695-96. 
79. By statute, the ultimate decision whether to extradite rests with the secretary of state. 18 U.S.C. 8 3186; 
see also 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 184 (1 88 1). The secretary may consider de novo the evidence that was before the 
court, as well as new evidence, but is not required to do so. See Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 
COLUM. L. REV. 13 13, 1328 (1962). 
80. See Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 n.11 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 884 (1973); 
Non-Inquiry, supra note 13, at 755. 
8 1. See Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1 105 (5th Cir. 1980); Peroff v. Hylton, 563 F.2d 1099, 
1 102-03 (4th Cir. 1977). 
82. To assist prosecutors in preparing complaints for provisional arrest warrants, the Department of Justice 
provides a sample complaint in the U.S. Attorneys' Manual. The form requires that the treaty provisions allowing 
provisional arrest be set forth, along with a statement as to the existence and nature of the foreign charge, a brief 
synopsis of the facts, and the existence of a foreign arrest warrant. No details are required to support the charges 
or the belief that the accused poses a risk of flight. The model is as follows: 
COMPLAINT FOR PROVISIONAL ARREST WITH A VIEW TOWARDS EXTRADITION 
(18 U.S.C. sec. 3184) 
I, the undersigned Assistant United States Attorney, being duly sworn, state on information and belief 
that the following is true and correct: 
1. In this matter I act for and on behalf of the Government of 
2. There is an Extradition Treaty in force between the United States and 
[ c i t e ] - ;  
3. The treaty provides in Article - for the provisional arrest and detention of fugitives pending 
the submission of a formal requcst and supporting documents; 
4. In accordance with Article - of the treaty, the Government of has asked the 
United States for the provisional arrest of [ n a m e  of f u g i t i v e ]  with a view towards 
hisiher extradition; 
5. According to the information provided by the requesting state in the form authorized by the 
treaty, [ n a m e  of fugitive]- was charged with - count(s) of 
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judge or magistrate.83 In a case in which the United States already has an interest, the U.S. 
law enforcement agency concerned with that matter might play a large role in the warrant 
request and the arrest.84 The arrest warrant may provide for the seizure of evidence, or there 
may be a separate search warrant. If the arrestee is a foreign national, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) may also become involved. Once the arrest has been made, 
the Justice Department, usually through the U.S. Attorney's Office, handles the court 
proceedings on behalf of the requesting nation,85 including any collateral challenges. The 
government does not typically present live witnesses, but relies instead on the documentary 
evidence provided by the requesting nation.86 
G. The Role of the Court 
As stated earlier, extraditions originally functioned under the executive branch as part 
of that branch's foreign affairs function, carried out without legislative or judicial 
supervision.87 However, current extradition law is a creature of treaties, negotiated by the 
executive branch and approved by the legislature. Most current treaties give general 
[ o f f e n s e ] ,  in violation of Section - of the Criminal Code of 
committed within the jurisdiction of and a warrant or his arrest was issued on 
[ d a t e ]  by , a L j u d g e / m a g i s t r a t e ]  of 
6. The warrant was issued on the basis of the following facts: 
7. The offense with which [ n a m e  of fugitive]- is charged is provided for in Article 
- of the Extradition Treaty cited above; 
8. [ N a m e  of f u g i t i v e ]  may be found within the jurisdiction of this court [ g i v e  
l o c a t i o n ] ,  
9. The requesting state has represented that it will submit a formal request for extradition, 
supported by the documents specified in the treaty, within - days, as required by Article 
- of the Extradition Treaty. 
WHEREFORE, the undersigned complainant requests that a warrant for the arrest of the a forenamed 
[sic] person be issued in accordance with Title 18, United States Code, Section 3184, and the 
Extradition Treaty between the United States and 
U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 1, at Criminal Resource Manual 5  616. There is no requirement that facts 
demonstrating probable cause be alleged. That is in contrast to the model form to be used when it is the United 
States that is seeking a provisional arrest in a foreign nation. There the federal prosecutor is instructed to provide 
sufficient information to establish probable cause. See Wiehl, supra note 8, at 749 n.67; U.S. ATTORNEYS' 
MANUAL, supra note 1, 8  9-15.230. 
83. Typically an Assistant U.S. Attorney swears to the complaint, on information and belief, based on the 
information provided by the requesting state. See Wiehl, supra note 8, at 749. Although complaints and warrants 
may be based on information and belief in domestic criminal cases, the information and belief in a request for a 
provisional arrest may be simply that a foreign charge has been made and a foreign warrant exists. See Parretti v. 
United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997). The need for a copy of the arrest warrant may even be dispensed 
with, and the details of the crime need not be specified. See Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 193 (1902); Bifani, 
supra note 37, at 643. 
84. For example, in a major drug trafficking case the Drug Enforcement Administration may already be 
working with enforcement authorities in the requesting state, as occurred in the Tafur case. See discussion infra 
Part V.A. 
85. Generally, the U.S. Attorney for the district where the proceeding is held is responsible for the 
proceedings, with the assistance of attorneys from the Criminal Division's Office of International Affairs in 
Washington, D.C. See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 1, at $5  9-15.210,9-15.700. 
86. In most cases, once the hearing actually occurs, it is not lengthy. But that is not always the situation, and 
there have been prolonged proceedings in which both the government and the accused presented witnesses on 
various issues. See, e.g., In re Mahmoud Abed Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032, 1050-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). 
87. In 1799, then-Congressman John Marshall asserted that the power to extradite was a function of the 
executive branch's power to conduct foreign affairs. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 596618  (1800) (refening to United 
States v. Robbins, 27 F. Cas. 825 (S.C.S.C. 1799) (no. 16,175)). 
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responsibility for extradition to the executive, investing it with the ultimate authority to 
determine whether rendition is to be made, but requiring the court to determine whether the 
treaty has been complied with, standards met, and procedures followed.88 
Because of the bifurcated nature of the extradition process, the proper roles of the 
judiciary and the executive have been debated. Some commentators have argued that 
allowing the secretary of state the final say on extradition usurps the role of the judiciary in 
violation of the Separation of Powers Clause of the U.S. ~ o n s t i t u t i o n . ~ ~  Others have 
reasoned that extradition is a matter of foreign affairs and that the role of the judiciary 
derives not from Article 111, but as an adjunct to the exec~tive.~' Thus the court is arguably 
exercising Article I1 rather than Article 111 powers when ruling on extradition matters. 
There have been challenges to the current extradition scheme on separation of powers 
grounds, but these generally have been rejected by the  court^.^' Such rejection seems 
sound, since Congress may define the scope of the court's jurisdiction. Moreover, the court 
is simply certifying that procedures have been met, leaving the political decision to the 
executive. Nevertheless, the issue remains unsettled. 
In any event, most courts appear to believe that the jurisprudence leaves them little 
room to exercise some of their normal judicial prerogatives. Typically courts consider 
themselves limited to the determination of five factors: (1) whether a valid treaty is in 
existence; (2) whether the crime is one covered by the treaty; (3) whether the conduct is also 
criminal in the asylum state;92 (4) whether the individual is the party sought by the foreign 
government; and (5) whether there is probable cause to believe that the individual sought 
committed the crime. The courts eschew inquiries into the motivation of the extraditing 
state, the judicial processes of the requesting state, and the conditions that the accused will 
face if returned.93 These issues are deemed to be within the purview of the secretary of state 
who, it is assumed, would not enter into an extradition treaty with a nation whose judicial 
processes and treatment of prisoners are not acceptable. Much deference is given to the role 
of the secretary in conducting foreign policy duties and to the need for comity in foreign 
affairs. Thus, the rule of "non-inquiry" has developed, along with other rules and standards 
to expedite the process.94 
88. See generally, e.g., Extradition Treaty, Sept. 14, 1979, U.S.-Colom., S. TREATY DOC. NO. 97-98 (1981). 
89. See, e.g., Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1995) (finding the statute unconstitutional on 
separation of powers grounds), vacated on other grounds, 82 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1996), analyzed in Marston, 
supra note 16. 
90. LoDuca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Kirby, 102 F.3d 365, 374 
n. 1 l (9th Cir. 1996). 
91. Even the district court in Lobue indicated that the statute would pass constitutional muster if it did not 
require that the court forward a copy of all of the hearing testimony to the secretary. Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 72- 
74. One commentator has suggested that the separation of powers issue might be addressed by amending the 
statute to reverse the order in which the court and the State Department review the cases, or that the entire 
fimction be vested in the executive, providing for review by administrative law judges. Bedrick, supra note 27, at 
400-03. 
92. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
93. See discussion of the rule of non-inquiry infra Part V.H. 
94. The Supreme Court has recognized that even the comity doctrine, which concerns the deference states 
afford each other, is protective of individual rights: 
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor mere 
courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its 
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are 
under the protection of its laws. 
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,,163-64 (1895), quoted in Bifani, supra note 37, at 658 n. 174. 
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A.  Individual Rights Under the U.S. Constitution 
A criminal defendant in the United States enjoys a broad range of constitutional 
protections. Over time, these protections have been refined and expanded through judicial 
interpretation as our notions of individual rights have grown. A person may not be arrested 
or incarcerated without probable cause; he must be apprised of the evidence against him and 
have an opportunity to refute it by confronting his accusers and by presenting evidence in 
his own behalf; he is presumed innocent until proven otherwise; he has a right to counsel; 
and he has a right to a speedy trial.'' If incarcerated, he typically has a right to bail. By 
statute and case law, a defendant will usually be able to discover important aspects of the 
government's case. Unfortunately, many of these protections may not extend to a person 
arrested on an extradition warrant. 
B. Individual Rights Under International Law 
The place accorded the individual in international law has changed radically over time, 
depending upon the needs of intercourse among nations and, to some degree, on theories of 
international law espoused by commentators. This historical development is only 
capsulized in this artic~e. '~ 
Some of the earliest concerns for the rights of individuals in international law arose 
when citizens of one nation were subjected to injuries or wrongs by a foreign nation, usually 
while traveling abroad. Since the home state often had a strong economic interest in the 
well-being of its citizens abroad, the rule evolved that a state has the right to demand 
reparations for injuries to its citizens from the foreign nation where the injury occ~rred .~ '  A 
concomitant rule was that a state was responsible for the treatment of foreigners within its 
boundaries. The method of seeking reparations was originally by private action, sanctioned 
by the home state.98 This later changed to more formal action by the state itself, including 
blockading ports or seizing terr i t~ry.~ '  As international claims commissions or arbitration 
entities were established, states submitted conflicts involving injuries to private parties. As 
a prerequisite to bringing an international claim, the doctrine of exhaustion developed, 
requiring an individual to have sought and exhausted remedies available in the offending 
state."' But even though the injury occurred to private parties, it was the state that was 
entitled to redress and was the proper party in an international proceeding.'0' 
Although international law was traditionally concerned with the protection of a 
nation's citizens abroad, instances of actions taken by a nation or nations to protect citizens 
95. U.S. CONST. amend. V (double jeopardy; self-incrimination; due process); amend. VI (speedy trial; 
confronting accusers; right to counsel); see Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) @resumption of 
innocence); U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right 
to confront accusers); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel). 
96. See, e.g., P.K. Menon, The International Personality of Individuals in International Law: A Broadening 
of the Trudifional Doctrine, 1 J .  TRANSNAT'L L. & PoL'Y 151 (1992); Louis B. Sohn, The New International 
Law: Protection of the Rights oflndividuals ~ a i h e r  Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982). 
97. Sohn, supra note 96, at 2. 
98. Id. at 3. The home slate would typically issue letters of marque and reprisal authorizing private parties to 
seize ships or goods of the offending nation. Id. 
99. Id. at 3. 
100. Id. at 4. 
101. Id. at 4. 
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from persecution by their own governments did occur. Typically this involved minority 
populations. Protection for such populations became formalized after World War I with the 
formation of the League of Nations, but the protection of individual rights as a concern of 
international law did not truly come to the fore until after World War 11.''~ AS a result of 
the atrocities carried out by Nazi Germany, the world perspective on human rights was 
altered, and the status of individuals in international law was tran~formed."~ This new 
status was reflected in the creation of the Charter and other organizing instruments of the 
new United Nations. 
Although the Charter of the United Nations speaks primarily in terms of the conduct of 
nations, its preamble clearly affirms the central position that fundamental human rights hold 
in the foundation and mission of the organization.'04 One of the first major tasks undertaken 
by the General Assembly was to adopt a document drafted by the Commission on Human 
Rights. This Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)'" recognizes the existence of 
inalienable human rights and their transcendent significance and sets forth those rights as a 
"common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations."'06 Continuing the 
alteration of the traditional perception of the individual in international law, the Declaration 
asserts that an individual has the right to be recognized "everywhere as a person before the 
law.""' In over two dozen other articles, the Declaration sets forth a number of rights that 
are relevant to the extradition process. The various articles relevant to extradition declare 
the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention,''* to have a fair and public trial of 
any criminal charges,Io9 with all the guarantees necessary for a defense,"' and to be 
presumed innocent until proven otherwise."' Finally, the General Assembly declared it an 
inalienable individual right to be free of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment.''2 Although the Declaration is not a treaty or convention, and, thus, not 
binding by its own terms, it has been recognized and acquiesced to by most nations to the 
extent that it has become customary international law.'I3 Its legal guarantees are also 
contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),"~ which the 
United States has ratified,'15 albeit with conditions relevant to Victor Tafur's case.'I6 
102. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 23. Until WWII individuals were not subjects under 
international law. To be a subject in international law means to be "capable of possessing international rights and 
duties and endowed with the capacity to take legal action in the international plane." Menon, supra note 96, at 
152. 
103. Sohn, supra note 96, at 6. 
104. U.N. CHARTER pmbl., 7 2. The Charter does, however, specify that it is not authorizing "the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." Id. art. 2 , 7  7. 
105. G.A. Res. 21 7A (m), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. ,41810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
106. Id.71. 
107. Id. art. 6. 
108. Id. art. 9. 
109. Id. art. 10. 
I 10. Id. art. 1 l(1). 
11 1. UDHR, supra note 105. By contrast, the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly establish a presumption 
of innocence. The Supreme Court, however, has found it to be "a basic component of a fair trial under our system 
of criminal justice," Estelle v. Williams, 4425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976), and required by due process considerations. 
Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478,485-86 (1978). 
1 12. UDHR, supra note 105, art. 5. 
113. Quigley, supra note 42, at 425; Sohn, supra note 96, at 12, 16-17. Customary international law arises 
from the practices of states in their dealings with one another wkich give rise to a consensus on the law and to 
expectations among members of the international community that states will conform their behavior to these 
norms. See SHEARER, supra note 16, at 138. Customary international law is part of the U.S. common law, unless 
it has been altered by legislative or executive action. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Hornrig, 
supra note 36, at 695-97. 
114. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into 
force Mar. 23, 1976), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. N 6 3  16 (1966). 
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR]. The Covenant was opened for signature by the UN General 
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Numerous conventions and treaties dealing with human rights issues have been 
formulated after the establishment of the United Nations and the adoption of the UDHR, 
both on a global and a regional level. We may look to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European  onv vent ion),"^ the American 
Convention for Human Rights (American   on vent ion),"^ the Convention Against Torture 
(CAT),"' the Convention Relating to the Status of ~ e f u ~ e e s , ' ~ '  and others for guidance on 
current norms of human rights.l2I These various conventions have been described by one 
commentator as a "pyramid of documents, with the Charter at its apex," which is "a 
veritable internationalization and codification of human rights law, an international bill of 
human rights."'22 
. One of the most important elements of this pyramid is the ICCPR. Crafted by the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights and approved by the General Assembly, this 
document formally codifies and elaborates upon those principles set forth in the Declaration, 
making them binding obligations on the nations that are parties to the Covenant. In addition 
Assembly in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. As of December 18, 2001, 152 countries were parties or 
signatories to the Convention, including the United States and Colombia. Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, available at 
http://www.unhcr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2002). 
115. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER ~ T E R N A T ~ O N A L  
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1,2000, at 392-93 (2000). 
116. The first is a reservation to Article 7 that "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" has 
the same meaning as it would under the Fifth, Eighth, andlor Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 
See U.S. Reservations, Declarations & Understandings, ICCPR, 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 
1992), Reservation 3, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ht1nl/menu3/b/treaty5asp.htm [hereinafter ICCPR 
Reservations]. In ratifying the ICCPR the Senate also declared that the provisions of the Covenant were largely 
non-self-executing. See ICCPR Reservations, Declaration I. The U.S. also spelled out a specific understanding 
regarding ICCPR art. 10, segregation of unconvicted prisoners. See Sohn, supra note 96, at 12. 
117. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 222, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention], available 
at hnp:Nconventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm. 
1 18. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1 144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 11- 
19 (entered into force July 18, 1978), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673, 685-93 (1970), available at 
http:Nwww.umn.edulhumanrts/oasinstr~zoas3con.htm [hereinafter American Convention]. The United States has 
never ratified the Convention. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States, 
Signatures and Current Status of Ratifications: American Convention on Human Rights, 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/B%EIsicos/basic4.htm (last visited Feb. 8,2002). 
119. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Feb. 4, 1985, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. AIRES/39/708 
(1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), modified in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985), 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/htmVmenu3/b/h-cat39 [hereinafter CAT]. The United States and 
Colombia are parties to the Convention. U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings, Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed., 
Oct. 27, 1990), available at http://wwwl.umn.edulhumanrts/usdocs/tortres.html [hereinafter U.S. CAT 
Reservations]; see supra note 105. 
120. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force, 
April 22, 1954), arts. 1(A)(2), 33(1); incorporated by reference into the Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 78 (1967). The United States ratified the 
Protocol, and incorporated the definition of refugee into the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
$ 8  1101(42), 1253(h) (2001). Wilson, supra note 13, at 762 n.32. The Convention prohibits the expulsion or 
return of refugees if, because of their political opinions, their life or liberty would be threatened. Convention 
Relating to thc Status of Refugees, supra, art. 37. See Nicosia v. Wall, 442 F.2d 1005, I006 n.4 (5th Cir. 1971). 
12 1. See, e.g., Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the 
CSCE, June 29, 1990,29 I.L.M. 1305. This treaty is one of several adopted by the former Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
122. Sohn, supra note 96, at 12. 
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to precluding arbitrary arrest or d e t e n t i ~ n , ' ~ ~  cruel and unusual punishment, and torture'24 
and requiring fair public trials,'25 the Covenant establishes a general rule in favor of bail for 
persons awaiting Like the Charter, the ICCPR guarantees an accused a presumption 
of innocenceI2' and, in a provision important to the Tafur proceeding, establishes that an 
accused who is incarcerated while awaiting trial is to be segregated from those already 
convicted and accorded separate treatment as appropriate to someone who has not been 
convicted of a crime.'28 
CAT expands upon both the Charter and the lCCPR in order to effectuate their 
restrictions on torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Torture is 
defined in this Convention as intentional infliction of severe physical or mental pain for 
eliciting information, intimidating, or punishing an individual, done by or with the 
acquiescence of a public 0fficia1.I~~ Article 3 of the Convention prohibits any party from 
extraditing an individual if there are substantial grounds to believe that he would be 
subjected to torture in the requesting state.130 The requested state may consider all of the 
relevant information and circumstances, including whether the requesting state has a pattern 
of human rights violations of a gross and flagrant nature.13' In such a case, the requested 
state is bound by its obligations under the Convention to refuse e~ t rad i t i0n . I~~  
123. ICCPR, supra note 114, art. 9, 7 I. Unlawful arrest and detention is also prohibited by the African 
Charter on Human and People's Rights, O.A.U. Doc. CABlLEGl6713 rev. 5 (entered into force on Oct. 21, 1986), 
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), available at hnp://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrtsloasinstrlzoas6cts.htm, the 
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 11 8, at art. 7; and the European Convention, supra note 117, 
art. 5. 
124. ICCPR, supra note 114, art. 7. The United States ratified the treaty, but with a reservation. See supra 
note 1 16. 
125. ICCPR, supra note 114, art. 9 , 7 3 .  
126. Id. 
127. Id. art. 14,72. See also European Convention, supra note 117, art. 6, 7 2 .  
128. ICCPR, supra note 114, art. 10,72(a). The U.N. Human Rights Committee is charged with oversight 
of the ICCPR. See UNHCHR, Introduction to the Human Rights Committee, at http:llwww.unhchr.chIhtmV 
menu2/6/a/introhrc.htm. General Comment 21, 7 9, issued by the Committee, notes that segregation of accused 
persons from those already convicted "is required in order to emphasize their status as unconvicted persons who at 
the same time enjoy the right to be presumed innocent as stated in article 14, paragraph 2." Compilation of 
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. GAOR, Hum. 
Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc HRUGENIIIRev.5 (2001). In ratifying the ICCPR the United States asserted its 
understanding that "the reference to 'exceptional circumstances' in paragraph 2 (a) of Article 10 to permit the 
imprisonment of an accused person with convicted persons where appropriate in light of an individual's overall 
dangerousness, and to permit accused persons to waive their right to segregation from convicted persons." United 
States Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. 
EXEC. REP. NO. 102-23 (1992), reprinted in 3 1 I.L.M. 645 (1992) (on file with author). 
129. CAT, supra note 119, art. 1 , s  1. Regarding a similar provision in the ICCPR, General Comment 20, 
7 5, to the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee notes that the prohibition is not limited to infliction of physical 
pain, but also applies to "acts that cause mental suffering to the victim." ICCPR General Comment 20, Hum. Rts. 
Comm., 44th Sess. (1992), in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 30, U.N. Doc. HRVGEN/I/Rev.I (1994), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf [hereinafter General Comment 201. 
130. CAT, supra note 119, art. 3, 7 1. A similar provision is found in the ICCPR. General Comment 20, 
Paragraph 9 to the ICCPR notes the Committee's view that "States parties must not expose individuals to the 
danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way 
of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement." General Comment 20, supra note 129. 
13 1. CAT, supra note 119, art. 3, 7 2. 
132. A similar provision is found in Article 9 of the International Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205. It provides that a state holding a person accused of hostage taking 
should not accede to an extradition request if there is reason to believe that the request was made for the purpose 
of punishing him on account of his ethnic origin or other impermissible factors, including political opinion. Id. 
art. 9, 7 1. Extradition should also be refused if the person's position would be prejudiced due to the same 
impermissible factors. Id. art. 9 , 7  l(b)(i). 
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The treaties and conventions are binding by their terms on parties, but even for those 
who have not adhered to a treaty, provisions which constitute peremptory human rights 
norms are binding as jus ~ o ~ e n s ' ~ ~  (i.e., overriding principles) under international law, and 
under the terms of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna  onv vent ion).'^^ 
Under Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, a treaty is deemed void ab initio if it conflicts 
with a peremptory norm of international law.'35 Thus, human rights law as derived from 
human rights treaties is superior to, and controlling over, other treaties, including extradition 
treaties, under public international law. Moreover, even if the formal provisions of an 
extradition treaty are not violative of human rights norms, the application of those 
provisions might be-a point that will be further explored below.'36 Finally, regardless of 
whether a treaty is binding upon a state, it may provide guidance in determining 
contemporary human rights norms that should inform a court's decision in extradition 
proceedings. 
C. The European Court of Human Rights and Other Regional Bodies 
Although a specific judicial tribunal for human rights does not exist at the global level, 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee established by the I C C P R ' ~ ~  has developed 
jurisprudence of increasing importance to the analysis of international human rights 
issues.138 Additionally, significant judicial decisions shaping human rights jurisprudence 
have been made at the regional level under the European Convention and the American 
Convention. Under both conventions non-judicial commissions provide oversight of human 
rights matters, and judicial tribunals have been established. The European Commission for 
Human Rights has accepted over 16,000 complaints that the Convention has been violated 
since its inception in 1953.'~' It has referred numerous cases to the European Court of 
133. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention defines jus cogens as accepted norms from which no derogation is 
permitted. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force 
Jan. 27, 1988), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Not all human rights norms are jus 
cogens. Among those that are generally accepted are "torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment," and "prolonged arbitrary detention." RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, $ 5  702(d), (e) cmt. n (1987). 
The Restatement suggests that release on bail may not be required if trial is not unreasonably delayed. Id. Q: 702 
cmt. h. However, the detention is arbitrary if the wamnt  is not sufficiently specific. Id. The United States has 
also stated that arbitrariness will result if the detention "is incompatible with the principles of justice or with the 
dignity of the human person." Id. (citing Statement of U.S. Delegation, U.N. GAOR, at 137, U.N. Doc. 
AIC.3lSR.863 (1958)). "A state may also violate customary international law if it engages in or condones "a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, 
§ 702(g). 
134. See Vienna Convention, supra note 133, art. 53. The United States agreed to Article 53. with 
reservations and has not ratified the Convention. RESTATEMENT, supra note 51, at pt. Ill, introductory cmt. 
Nevertheless, the principles of Article 53 are recognized as customary international law; even if not binding on the 
United States, they may provide a useful guidepost to courts in an extradition matter. See id. 5  33 1 rpts. n.4. 
135. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5 1, 33 1 (2)(b); see id. 5 702 cmt. n. 
136. Not only do individuals have rights enunciated and protected by the Charter, the Declaration, the 
ICCPR, and the various conventions and other instruments, they also may in some instances have a venue for 
seeking redress-the International Court of Justice. The jurisdiction of the court extends to all matters specifically 
provided for in the Charter and in treaties and conventions, as well as cases referred by parties. Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 3 6 , l  I, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (entered into force Oct. 24, 
1945), available at http:Nwww.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocumentslBasetex~ista~te.htm. 
137. ICCPR, supra note 114, art. 28. The United Nations Human Rights Committee operates under the 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 17 1 ,6  I.L.M. 383 (1 967). 
138. See Richard J. ~ i l s o n ,  Using International Human Rights Law and Machinery In Defending 
Borderless Crime Cases, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1606, 1608 (1997) [hereinafter Borderless Crime]. 
139. Kevin Boyle, Europe: The Council of Europe, the CSCE, and the European Community, in GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 135, 138-52 (Hurst Hannum ed., 2d ed. 1992). 
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Human ~ i ~ h t s . ' ~ '  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter- 
American Court for Human Rights implement the American  onv vent ion.'^^ The tribunals 
have developed a body of jurisprudence that extracts many of its principles from basic 
norms of human rights found in the Charter and other UN instruments. Indeed, the 
European Court has been especially active, developing into one of the world's foremost 
sources of human rights law by providing innovative interpretations and greatly expanding 
the protection of human rights.142 
D. The United States' Duties Under International Human Rights Law 
Although international human rights law creates individual rights and imposes duties 
upon states, this reality is often not recognized in the United States' judicial system. 
Perhaps because of our geographic isolation, most American citizens-and probably most 
lawyers and jurists-seldom think beyond the federal Constitution and statutes as the 
highest law of the United States. But as previously noted, treaties to which the United 
States is a party and customary international law are part of the law of the land. As a 
signatory to the UDHR, the ICCPR, CAT, the Hostage Convention, and other treaties, the 
United States has agreed, with certain reservations, to be bound by their provisions and to 
incorporate them into U.S. law.143 Thus, the United States must, inter alia, accord a 
presumption of innocence to an extraditee, afford adequate procedural protections, and 
assure that the human rights of the individual will not be jeopardized by extradition to the 
requesting nation. To the extent that any of these obligations conflict with existing U.S. 
laws and practices, those' laws and practices should be conformed to the nation's 
international obligations whenever p0ssib1e.l~~ 
In recent years scholars have examined a number of extradition-related issues under 
U.S. law. Although the Supreme Court has not dealt directly with extradition since early in 
the last century, its decision in U.S. v. ~ l v a r e z - ~ a c h a i n , ~ ~ '  involving abduction in lieu of 
extradition, was the subject of commentary. Along similar lines, the decision of the Ninth 
Circuit in Parretti v. United applying traditional bail standards to an extradition 
detention, has received scholarly scrutiny.14' Less attention has been paid, however, to the 
numerous human rights issues that can arise in an extradition process. These concerns can 
be raised more clearly, perhaps, in the context of a particular case. 
140. See generally The European Commission, Role of the European Commission, at 
http:l/www/europea~enlint/comrn/role~en.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002). 
141. The American Convention established the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter- 
American Court of Human Rights. See American Convention, supra note 118, chs. VI1, VIII. 
142. Michael P. Shea, Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extradition Cases Afier Soering, 17 
YALE J. INT'L L. 85, 99, 101 (1993). Especially noteworthy is the court's expanded definition of torture. Id. at 
101-02. Even if not "torture," inhumane conduct violates Article 3 of the European Convention. Egrnez v. 
Cyprus, App. No. 30873196 (Dec. 21, 2000) 7 79, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ 
ViewRoot.asp?Item=O&Action=Html&X=109203 149&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=0. Petitions will 
only be accepted by the European Court of Human Rights if the petitioner has exhausted all domestic remedies. 
European Convention, supra note 117, art. 35,7  1 (originally art. 25). 
143. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 114, art. 2 (requiring each state to adopt laws and rules to guarantee the 
rights and freedoms set forth in the Covenant). The United States signed the Torture Convention with 
reservations. See U.S. CAT Reservations, supra note 119. 
144. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1 lth Cir. 1986). 
145. 504 U.S. 655 (1992). 
146. 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997). 
147. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Olson, Gauging an Adequate Probable Cause Standard for Provisional Arrest in 
Light of Parretti v. United States, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 161 (1998). 
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The March 4 arrest was dramatic. Gun-toting Drug Enforcement Administration 
agents stopped a van near Philadelphia and pulled out Victor Manuel Tafur- 
Dominguez. Justice Department officials proudly announced he was a fugitive 
drug trafficker who would be the first Colombian ever extradited from the 
U[nited] S[tates] to ~ 0 1 o m b i a . l ~ ~  
The arrest, described by Tafur as "cinematographic," began a nightmarish process for 
the Colombian lawyer who was in the United States, studying for a master's degree in 
environmental law.I4' The detention was based on a warrant issued by Colombia, charging 
Tafur with suspicion of having participated in financing a multi-million dollar cocaine 
deal.150 In fact, Tafur was an unlikely drug financier, since both he and his family had a 
long history of actively opposing drugs and drug traffickers. His father, Donald Tafur, had 
served for seventeen years in leadership positions in both the Colombian House of 
Representatives and Senate. He was instrumental in the late 1970s and early 1980s in 
securing legislative approval of the U.S.-Colombia Extradition  rea at^,"' which provides for 
the extradition of drug dealers from Colombia to stand trial in the United 
Ironically, the government would use this very treaty against his son. 
When the Treaty was ratified Senator Tafur began to receive death threats, and he and 
his family lived under armed guard for a number of years.'53 In 1992, he was assassinated at 
his home.154 Victor Tafur, like his father, worked to stem the drug trade in Colombia. He 
was a highly placed official in the presidential program Plante-a government program to 
teach farmers to plant alternative crops instead of coca and poppy-when he was gravely 
injured in a plane crash in the Andes while on an official m i ~ s i 0 n . l ~ ~  In June 1999, he came 
148. Douglas Waller & Cathleen Farrell, The DEA's Big Bust: Did They Get the Wrong Guy?, TIME, Apr. 
17,2000, at 18. 
149. See Douglas Waller & Cathleen Farrell, Nightmare on 1-95 Manuel Tafur Faces Extradition to 
Colombia on Cocaine Charges. But is it All a Mistake?, TIME LNT'L, Apr. 17, 2000, at 20. 
150. In December 1998, Colombian authorities seized a shipment of 6219 kilos of cocaine in Cartagena 
destined for Spain, worth over $120 million wholesale, secreted in shipping containers. Complaint at 2, In re 
Tafur-Dominguez, No. 00-M-154-1 (E.D. Pa. filed May 3, 2000) [hereinafter Complaint]; Hearing Record at 6, 
22, In re Tafur-Dominguez, No. 00-M-154-1 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 2000) [hereinafter Hearing (May 3, 2000)l; Waller 
& Farrell, supra note 148, at 18. 
151. U.S.-Colombia Extradition Treaty, supra note 10. Senator Tafur was a principal sponsor of the 
Extradition Treaty for ratification in the Senate of Colombia, and wrote a treatise, INTERNATIONAL PENAL LAW 
(1969), in which he described extradition and its key elements. See Waller & Farrell, supra note 149, at 20. 
152. The extradition treaty was enacted by the Colombian Congress as a result of the inability of Colombian 
courts to convict, and Colombian jails to contain, narcotraffickers. The cartels reacted violently, waging a 
campaign of terror against public officials, journalists, and human rights activists. See generally GABRIEL 
GARCIA MARQUEZ, NEWS OF A KIDNAPPING (1996). The cartel leaders called themselves "The Extraditables," and 
their motto became, "Better a grave in Colombia than a cell in the United States." Id. at 22; see Nadelmann, 
supra note 3, at 852-55; Luz E. Nagle, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Fear: Some Thoughts on Colombian 
Extradition, 13 Lou. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 85 1, 869 (199 1). 
153. He was also critical of the government and its failure to prosecute the drug cartels, and sponsored 
amendments to the Penal Code to address the drug trade. Declaration [of Victor Manuel Tafur-Dominguez] 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, at 2-3, In re Tafur-Dominguez (INS May 8, 2000) (A#077-626-394); see also 
Robert Armengol, Tafur Calls Drug Case "Baseless", THE INTELLIGENCER, Jan 2,2001 (on file with author). 
154. See Hearing (May 3, 2000), supra note 150, at 56; Asesinudo Donald Tafur, EL PA~S (Cali), Mar. 7, 
1992, at Al .  
155. In March 1999, Victor Tafur and other colleagues, officials, and reporters were in two light planes on 
an official trip in the Andes. The plane in which Tafur was riding crashed in the mountains. For over two days 
rescuers were unable to reach the plane, and when they did, they found all of the seven occupants dead but Tafur, 
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to the United States to receive medical treatment and to recover from his injuries. He stayed 
with his mother, who had moved to the United States, remarried, and become a naturalized 
U.S. citizen, living outside of Philadelphia. That fall, while still recovering from the 
injuries, Tafur commenced studies in New York for a master's degree in environmental law. 
Before Tafur left Colombia, the Colombian Congress made a large, long-delayed lump 
sum pension payment to his mother for the legislative service of his deceased father. 
Because of the ever-present danger of kidnapping,156 Tafur wished to move the money out 
of the country with dispatch.157 TO do so, it was necessary to exchange the pesos for dollars. 
In doing that Tafur wrote a number of checks, some of which were improperly reindorsed 
and wound up in the account of a sham corporation involved in the cocaine deal at the heart 
of the extradition matter. Those checks served as the basis for the charges of narcotics 
trafficking by the Colombian prosecutor in spite of the fact that all of the pension funds had 
been transferred to Mrs. Tafur's bank and were accounted for.I5* 
Colombia did not submit formal extradition papers but apparently requested by 
telephone that the U.S. State Department provisionally detain Tafur, as permitted under the 
 rea at^.'^' A U.S. warrant was issued for his arrest, and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) agents in Philadelphia took him into custody. Search warrants were 
subsequently executed at the house of his mother and stepfather and at Tafur's law school 
dormitory. I6O 
At an initial hearing before the extradition magistrate the government requested that 
Tafur be held without bail for sixty days, as provided in the Treaty, while the government 
obtained the appropriate paperwork from ~ o l o m b i a . ' ~ '  The judge expressed reservations 
who was close to death. See Subdirector del Plante en Estado Critico Despues del Accidente, DIARIO DE HUILA, 
Mar. 24, 1999, at Al ;  Un Sobreviviente en la Avioneta, EL nEMPO (Bogoth.), Mar. 23, 1999, at Al .  
156. There were approximately 3000 people kidnapped in Colombia in 1999, often to finance guerilla 
groups that utilize kidnapping and extortion as a major source of income. Jorge L. Esquirol, Can International 
Law Help? An Analysis of the Colombian Peace Process, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 23, 31 (2000); Paul Wellstone, 
Bush Should Start Over in Colombia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2000, at A31; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF 
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 1999 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: COLOMBIA 
(Feb. 25, 2000), at 21, available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human~rights/999~hrp~report/ 
colombia.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2001) [hereinafter 1999 COUNTRY REPORT]. A recent U.S. Department of State 
travel advisory warns U.S. citizens against travel to Colombia, noting the high levels of violence in all parts of the 
country due to narcotraffickers, guerrillas, paramilitary groups, and other criminal elements. The State 
Department hrther warned that: 
There is a greater risk of being kidnapped in Colombia than in any other country in the world. More 
than a dozen U.S. citizens were kidnapped in Colombia in 1999, twice as many as in 1998. Some 
have been individual incidents and others have involved large group hostage situations. In some 
cases, the victims have been murdered. Most kidnappings of U.S. citizens in Colombia have been 
committed by guerrilla groups, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and 
the National Liberation Army (ELN), which were both designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
by the Secretary of State in October 1997. 
U.S. Dep't of State, Colombia-Travel Warning, Jan. 28, 2000, at http://travel.state.gov/colombia~warning.html. 
157. Hearing (May 3,2000), supra note 150, at 35. As the court noted, considering the unsettled conditions 
in Colombia, a desire to transfer one's funds out of the country was certainly legitimate. Id. at 19. 
158. Hearing (May 3,2000), supra note 150, at 44-45. 
159. U.S.-Colombia Extradition Treaty, supra note 10, art. 11. 
160. U.S.-Colombia Extradition Treaty, supra note 10, art. 11. There was no evidence of a crime committed 
in the United States. When the court later expressed concern about the sufficiency of the evidence supplied by 
Colombia to support the warrant, the government attempted to allay those fears by suggesting that U.S. money 
laundering statutes could have been violated. Letter from Virgil B. Walker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, to the 
Honorable Charles B. Smith, U.S. Magistrate Judge, In re Tafur-Dominguez, No. 00-M-154-1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 
2000) [hereinafter Letter from Virgil B. Walker]. 
161. U.S.-Colombia Extradition Treaty, supra note 10, art. 11. 
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about the evidence in the case as well as whether a situation of urgency existed to support 
provisional detention, but nevertheless declined to grant bail. Instead, he gave the 
government only thirty days in which to secure the charging  document^.'^^ When the 
government was unable to produce the requisite documents at the end of thirty days, the 
judge refused to continue to hold T a h r  and released him to "house arrest" at his mother's 
home.163 The judge further required that the pension money, which was in Mrs. Tafur's 
bank account, be posted as bond.164 Subsequently the government completed the paperwork 
and an extradition hearing was held. Tafur challenged not only probable cause, but also the 
validity of the Treaty and the procedures and conditions that he would face if returned to 
~ o l o m b i a . ' ~ ~  The extradition judge declined to consider any issues but probable cause.166 
The government presented documentary evidence to support its claim.'67 Tafur testified on 
his own behalf and also presented documentary evidence, some of which was rejected by the 
judge as "contradicting" rather than "explaining" the government's evidence.16' 
Nonetheless, at the conclusion of the hearing the court found no probable cause to believe 
that Tafur was involved with the drug scheme and refused to issue a certificate of 
e x t r a d i t a b i ~ i t ~ . ' ~ ~  
At a number of points in the process, the case law or decisions made by the court stand 
in sharp contrast to those standards of liberty and process normally associated with U.S. 
courts. From the denial of prehearing release, to the conditions of incarceration, to the 
162. Hearing Record at 9, 19, 25, In re Tafur-Dominguez, No. 00-M-154 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2000) 
[hereinafter Hearing (Apr. 13, 2000)l. 
163. Order, In re Tafur-Dominguez, No. 00-154-M (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13,2000) (setting conditions of release). 
164. Id. 
165. Amici Memorandum of Law, supra note 32, at 6. 
166. See Hearing (May 3, 2000), supra note 150, at 3; Hearing (Apr. 13, 2000), supra note 162, at 19. 
Several otherissues were urged upon the court: that the treaty had been invalidated by Colombia, that the requisite 
"dual criminality" was lacking, and that Tafur's human rights would be violated'if he was returned to Colombia. 
Amici Memorandum of Law, supra note 32, at 6. 
The Extradition Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Colombia was signed in Washington on 
September 14, 1979. It appeared to have been approved by Colombia (Law 27 of 1980) and entered into force on 
March 4, 1982. However, the circumstances of its approval by Colombia and subsequent actions by Colombia 
may have rendered the treaty unenforceable. See Kavas, supra note 32, at 495-96. Specifically, in 1991 
Colombia amended its Constitution to prohibit the extradition of Colombian citizens. CONSTITUCI~N P~LITICA DE 
COLOMBIA tit. I, art. 35 (1991), states "Se prohibe la extradition de colombianos por nacimiento." This 
prohibition under Colombian law came about because of the Medellin cartel's adamant opposition to extradition 
of Colombians to the United States. See Esquirol, supra note 156, at 32 n.26. The unenforceability of the treaty 
was in fact acknowledged by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 
585, 592 (3d Cir. 1992). The Colombian Constitution was again amended in 1997, Acto Legislativo Nfimero Ol 
de 1997 (Dec. 16, 1997) (Colom.); see Esquirol, supra note 156, at 32 n.26, but doubts were raised about its 
constitutionality. See Colombia to Deport Criminals, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Dec. 17, 1997, at 18 
(discussing the law passed by the Colombian legislature on November 25, 1997 permitting the extradition of 
Colombian nationals, but then-President Samper admitted that there were doubts about its constitutionality). 
Accordingly, amici argued that there was not an effective treaty of extradition for the court to enforce. In support 
of this argument amici cited a scholarly study written by Senator Donald Tafur, in which he emphasized that 
"[tlhe [Extradition] Treaty has been written based on absolute reciprocity, since it contemplates equal rights and 
obligations for each party." Amici Memorandum of Law, supra note 32, at 4 n.4. Amici further argued that 
according to the principles of international law-pacta sunt servanda--every treaty in force is binding upon the 
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. Amici Memorandum of Law, supra note 32, at 17. 
However, Colombia has ignored this requirement and amended its constitution to defeat the object and intent of 
the Extradition Treaty. Id. Thus even if the Treaty is not technically invalid de jure, it has at least been de facto 
invalidated, and lacked the reciprocal obligation required for valid extradition treaties. Id. 
167. See Hearing (May 3, 2000), supra note 150, at 4, 6, 24, 68, 69 (referencing previously submitted 
documents). 
168. Hearing (May 3,2000), supra note 150, at 53-54. 
169. Order, In re Tahr-Dominguez, No. 00-1 54-M (E.D. Pa. May 3,2000). 
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rejection of evidence, serious questions were presented about the extent to which there was 
a deprivation of Tafur's constitutional and human rights. 
A. Arrest, Search, and Seizure 
Colombia is a civil law country, with a judiciary composed of professional courts and 
a system of investigating prosecutors.'70 Unlike the United States, where prosecutorial and 
judicial functions are separated, the Colombian prosecutors may undertake functions of 
both.I7' The prosecutors not only carry out investigations, but have the authority to issue 
arrest warrants, and those warrants need not be based on probable cause.I7' Indeed, it 
appears that the general practice of the special drug prosecutors is to issue warrants for the 
detention of anyone related to a drug transaction in order to secure his testimony. 
Moreover, on matters involving drugs, individuals may be arrested merely on suspicion of 
illicit ac t iv i t i e~ . '~~  Because of the danger to the drug prosecutors from the cartels, in 1987 
the president of Colombia established anonymous-or "faceless"--courts and 
prosecutors.'74 A "faceless" special narcotics prosecutor issued the original warrant for 
~ a f u r ' ~ '  in September 1999, charging him with drug trafficking.'76 That warrant called for 
his arrest for i n ~ e s t i ~ a t i 0 n . l ~ ~  Tafur, who was in the United States, was not informed of the 
warrant but learned that the authorities were investigating his financial transactions before 
his law school's Christmas break. Once he became aware of the situation, he returned to 
Colombia to look into the matter and hired counsel in Colombia to analyze the situation. 
Tafur also secured a new student visa from the U.S. Embassy for his post-graduate studies in 
the United States and returned to New York to commence the new semester of c 1 a ~ s e s . l ~ ~  
No attempt to serve the warrant was made while he was in Colombia. 
It was not until over two months later that Tafur was arrested. He-or at least his 
mother's home-had apparently been under surveillance for many weeks before his 
arrest.'79 Tafur was taken into custody and questioned by both DEA and INS agents. The 
U.S. warrant that had been issued for his arrest was based on a complaint filed by an 
170. See Hearing (May 3, 2000), supra note 150, at 25-26 (prosecutor describes Colombian inquisitorial 
system); see also John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition (1998), reprinted in JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN 
& DAVID S. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS, CASES 
AND MATERIALS 696 (1 978). 
17 1. 1999 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 156, at 29. 
172. See ANDEAN COMM'N OF JURISTS, COLOMBIA: THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE 43-48 (1991) [hereinafter 
COLOMBIA: THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE]. 
173. Robert Weiner, War By Other Means: Colombia's Faceless Courts, NACLA REPORT ON THE 
AMERICAS, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 3 1,35. 
174. See infra note 320. The use of anonymous prosecutors was declared unconstitutional in 2000. Report 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, U.N. 
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 7 223, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001115 (2001) [hereinafter High Commissioner's Report]. 
175. The govemment attorneys argued to the court that their delay in obtaining information from the 
Colombian govemment was due to being unable to ascertain who the prosecutor handling the case was. See 
Hearing (Apr. 13,2000), supra note 162, at 17. 
176. Ley 30 de 1986, articulo 33, M~NISTERIO DE GOBIERNO LEYES (Law 30, art. 33 (1986) (Drug 
Trafficking)) (Colom.); see Complaint, supra note 150, at I .  
177. See Complaint, supra note 150, at 1. Pursuant to that warrant, bail could have been available after 
arrest. For whatever reason, a second warrant was issued on December 31, 1999, and that warrant called for 
detention without bail. See Complaint, supra note 150, at 1 ("Specialized Prosecutor in and for the Circuit of 
Santafe de Bogota, ordered the detention of Victor Manuel Tafur-Dominguez."). 
178. See Motion to Quash Arrest Warrant, Search Warrants and to Release Individual, In re Tafur- 
Dominguez, No. 00-154-M (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8,2000) at 4 [hereinafter Motion to Quash]. 
179. DEA agents had even conducted "trash runs" at Tafur's mother's house from January through March 
2000. Affidavit of Brian K. Kutz in support of application for search warrant, at 1 (approx. Mar. 4, 2000); see 
Letter from Virgil B. Walker, supra note 160. 
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Assistant U.S. Attorney. It contained only the sketchiest factual grounds to support the 
request and did not provide the source of any of the i n f o r m a t i ~ n . ' ~ ~  The complaint set forth 
the existence of the Colombian arrest warrant, but the only facts alleged concerning Tafur's 
conduct were that he had withdrawn money from his personal bank account and that the 
money was deposited into the accounts of a dummy corporation, E.I. Caribe, that 
constructed the containers for the seized cocaine shipment. The complaint did not allege 
that T a h r  made the deposit. The warrant was not based on either personal knowledge of the 
DEA agents or the Assistant U.S. Attorney, but on information transmitted from 
~ o l o m b i a . ' ~ '  No affidavits on personal knowledge by Colombian authorities, depositions, 
180. 'The Complaint reads as follows: 
I, Virgil B. Walker, the undersigned Assistant United States Attorney, being duly sworn, state on 
information and belief that the following is true and correct: 
I. In this matter, I act for and on behalf of the Republic of Colombia. 
2. There is a treaty of extradition in force between the United States ofAmerica and the Republic of 
Colombia . . . . 
3. Pursuant to the treaty, Colombia has submitted a formal request through diplomatic channels for 
the provisional arrest and extradition of Victor Manuel Tafur-Dominguez. 
4. Victor Manuel Tafur-Dominguez is the subject of an arrest warrant issued on September 27, 
1999, by the Prosecutor's Office for the Criminal Courts, Special Circuit, Narcotics sub-unit, Bogota, 
charging him with drug trafficking in violation of Article 33, Law 30, 1986. On December 3 I, 1999, 
the Specialized Prosecutor in and for the Circuit of Santafe de Bogota, ordered the detention of Victor 
Manuel Tafur-Dominguez. The sentence for this crime is 6 to 20 years in prison, except that Section 
38.3 of Law 30 provides that the penalty is doubled where the amount of drug confiscated exceeds 5 
kilograms (here it was 6,219 kilograms). Drug trafficking is covered as an extraditable offense by 
Article 2 of the Extradition Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Colombia. 
5. The warrant was issued on the basis of the following facts: Victor Manuel Tafur-Dominguez is 
believed to have financed the shipment of 6,219 kilograms of cocaine which was seized at the port of 
Cartagena on December 3, 1998. The cocaine was contained in secret compartments in six shipping 
containers. The containers were scheduled to be shipped through Jamaica and Cuba with a final 
destination of Spain. The shipping of the containers was amnged by the Colombian company E.I. 
Caribe. E.I. Caribe is a front company. The investigation that took place after the seizure of the 
6,219 kilograms of cocaine on December 3, 1998, uncovered physical evidence proving that E.I. 
Caribe employees constructed the false compartments in the shipping containers. The investigation 
also uncovered the fact that Victor Manuel Tafur-Dominguez withdrew approximately $560 million 
from his personal bank account and this money was deposited in the accounts of E.I. Caribe for the 
purpose of purchasing the containers in which the cocaine was concealed and packed. (I believe, and 
are [sic] attempting to confirm, that the $560 million is Colombian currency and therefore has a value 
of approximately 1 million United States dollars.) [This dollar figure was incorrect and grossly 
overstated.] 
6. Victor Manuel Taf~~r-Dominguez has fled outside the boundaries of the Republic of Colombia, 
and has been located by agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. 
7. [Description of Tafur.] 
8. The crime of narcotics trafficking, with which Victor Manuel Tafur-Dominguez is charged with 
having committed in the Republic of Colombia, is among the offenses enumerated in Article 2 of the 
treaty on extradition in force between the United States and the Republic of Colombia . . . . 
9. The immediate arrest of Victor Manuel Tafur-Dominguez pending receipt of a regular diplomatic 
request for extradition, with accompanying documents, is covered under Article I I of the extradition 
treaty providing for provisional arrest. 
10. I am informed through diplomatic channels that a regular diplomatic request for the extradition 
of the said Victor Manuel Tafur-Dominguez will be made in conformity with said treaty, and the 
complete papers upon which the demand for extradition is founded will be presented within two 
months as required by Article I I ,  of said treaty. 
Complaint, supra note 150, at 1-3. 
181. The complaint obviously was drafted using the model supplied to prosecutors in the U.S. Attorneys' 
Manual. See U.S. AITORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 1, Criminal Resource Manual 4 616. 
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or other supporting documents accompanied the information from Colombia. Nonetheless, 
the warrant was issued by the U.S. magistrate. After arresting and questioning Tafur, DEA 
agents secured a search warrantIs2 and executed it at both Tafur's mother's home in 
Pennsylvania and his dormitory room in New York, seizing papers, documents, and 
computers belonging to Tafur and his mother. 
It appears that most extradition warrants are provisional,'83 and courts have often 
distinguished between the probable cause required for an extradition request and the 
probable cause that would support a provisional arrest. For the latter, the showing was often 
rudimentary. The govenunent has consistently argued that the provisional arrest warrant 
could be based on information and belief rather than sworn personal knowledge, or at least 
on information and belief based on sworn testimony.ls4 The rationale for implementing a 
different standard of probable cause for a provisional arrest was that, if the government 
delayed in order to secure depositions or affidavits, the accused might flee and the United 
States would then be unable to comply with its various extradition treaty requirements. 
Thus, courts struggled with the extent and nature of proof required to support provisional 
detention. Early Supreme Court cases, while confusing, seemed to support the proposition 
that complaints could be based only on information and "belief."185 Lower courts 
interpreted these cases to permit a relaxed standard for proof.'86 Some went so far as to 
hold that a provisional arrest warrant could be issued with only a complaint either alleging 
the existence of a treaty, and that the accused had committed a crime covered by it,Is7 or just 
alleging that a foreign arrest warrant existed.Is8 
Recently, however, some courts have questioned these assumptions. The Second 
Circuit held that, although "the provisional arrest and extradition proceedings must differ in 
some way, the difference does not lie in the requirement of probable cause."1s9 And the 
Ninth Circuit was the first to declare that provisional arrest and detention without probable 
cause violated the Fourth ~mendment . '~ '  The Ninth Circuit was especially explicit, stating 
that "[tlhe clarity of this language allows for no exceptions, regardless of whether the 
government's purpose in making the arrest is to enforce treaties or our own domestic 
182. Search Warrant, In re Tafur-Dominguez, No. 00-M-154-1 (E.D. Pa. approx. Mar. 3, 2000). The search 
warrant was issued by a different magistrate than the one who had issued the arrest warrant. Tafur's counsel 
contended that the government deliberately sought another judge "at midnight" in order to avoid the magistrate 
who had issued the arrest warrant and was more experienced in search and seizure matters. Motion to Quash, 
supra note 178, at 5-6. 
183. See Wiehl, supra note 8, at 733 n.7. 
184. See id. at 734 n. 10. 
185. See generally Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 3 1 1, 313 (1925); Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 
514 (191 1); Yordi v. Nolte, 215 U.S. 227, 230-31 (1909); Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 193 (1902); Rice v. 
Arnes, 180 U.S. 371,374-75 (1901). 
186. In re Russell, 805 F.2d 12 15, 1217 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that evidence can be informal). 
187. United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 1984). 
188. In re Kraielburd, 786 F.2d 1395, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1986). 
189. Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 1980). Other courts have questioned treaties without 
deciding the constitutionality of provisional warrants issued without an evidentiary showing of probable cause. 
Sahagian v. United States, 864 F.2d 509, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1988); accord In re Russell, 805 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 
1986); United States v. Williams, 480 F. Supp. 482, 485 (D. Mass. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 61 1 F.2d 914 
(I st Cir. 1979). 
190. See Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 771 (9th Cir. 1997). 
191. See id.; see also Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) ("Warrants cannot be issued, 
of course, without the showing of probable cause required by the Warrant Clause."); Parretti, 122 F.2d at 771-72; 
In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1484 (7th Cir. 1984) (court may consider procedural defects and government conduct 
which may violate the Constitution); Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 348 (4th Cir. 1983) ("The United 
States government must, in carrying out its treaty obligations, conform its conduct to the requirements of the 
Constitution, and that treaty obligations cannot justify otherwise unconstitutional governmental conduct."); 
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The search executed on Tafur's home and dormitory room suffers from the same lack 
of probable cause. The application for the search warrant did little more than repeat the 
allegations contained in the application for the arrest warrant. The only additional 
information supplied to the court was that, while being questioned, Tafur told the agents that 
he had documentation to support his explanation of the financial transfer at his home. That 
information hardly seems to go further in supplying probable cause to believe that an 
offense had been committed than did the original allegations. Although the extradition 
magistrate never had to rule on a suppression motion regarding the search warrant, he did 
express concern about the sufficiency of the evidence supporting it and suggested that the 
seized items might be suppressed.'92 
B. Provisional Detention Without Bail 
Article 11 of the U.S.-Colombia Extradition Treaty provides that, in cases of urgency, 
the accused may be detained provisionally, for up to sixty days, without the filing of formal 
extradition papers.193 The Treaty does not deal with the question of bail. Thus, as noted 
earlier, even though the magistrate expressed reservations at the initial detention hearing 
regarding the existence of probable cause to support the arrest, he denied Tafur's request for 
release. This is hardly surprising, since the alleged offense involved a narcotics scheme 
worth over US$100 million and Tafur was a foreign national. However, the judge refused 
to give the government the full sixty days it sought, limiting it, instead, to thirty days. By 
the expiration of the thirty days, the government had not produced the extradition 
documents, and Tafur had been able to supply the court with ample information explaining 
the situation and attesting to his good character. Faculty, staff, and students from Tafur's 
law school had also filed an amicus brief on his behalf. Nonetheless, the government argued 
strenuously, with substantial case support, that, unlike a typical domestic criminal case,194 
bail was not allowed in extradition matters.I9' 
A "myth" of extradition practice is that bail is unavai~able . '~~ Actually, the courts 
have traditionally held that there is a presumption that bail will not be granted in an 
Angelo M. Russo, The Development of Foreign Extradition Takes a Wrong Turn in Light of the Fugitive 
Disentitlement Doctrine: Ninth Circuit Vacates the Requirentent of Probable Cause for a Provisional Arrest in 
Parretti v. United States, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 1041, 1059-62 (2000) (stating that other courts have held that the 
government must show probable cause not only for the extradition itself, but also for the provisional warrant). 
192. Letter from Virgil B. Walker, supra note 160, at 1. After the court refused to certify extradition, Tafur 
sought the return of the property that had been seized. The federal prosecutors maintained that an investigation 
was still pending in Colombia and refused to return the property. Included in the property were original 
immigration papers and other documents that Tafur was required to personally possess. Motion for Return of 
Property, In re Tafur-Dominguez, No. 00-154-M (E.D. Pa. June 22, 2000). It was not until threatened with a 
court hearing that the prosecutors returned the seized items to Tafur and his mother. 
193. U.S.-Colombia Extradition Treaty, supra note 10, art. l I. 
194. See Judiciary Act of 1789, chs. 20, 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (1789) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
4 3141(a) (1994)). Almost from the beginning of the Republic, arrestees in U.S. criminal cases have been 
accorded the right to conditional release pending trial. See 18 U.S.C. 4 3142(e)-(g) (1994). In order to obtain 
pretrial detention, the United States must demonstrate that the individual has been charged with a serious felony 
and that no conditions of release can guarantee his appearance at trial or protect the safety of the community. 
195. See 18 U.S.C. 4 3184 (1994). Nothing in the statute which controls extradition speaks to the issues of 
detention or bail. The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 3141, has been held by the courts to be inapplicable 
to extradition proceedings on the rationale that extraditions are not criminal in nature, and that the Bail Act 
applies only to U.S. criminal proceedings. See Kamrin v. United States, 725 F.2d 1225, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). 
196. Kester, supra note 28, at 1447-49; see Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 430 F. Supp. 915, 916 (D. Mass. 1977), 
rev'd, 553 F.2d 92 (1st Cir. 1977) (noting that granting bail was the rule rather than the exception, but on limited 
review of cases). 
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extradition matter, and that only when there are "special circumstances" will an extraditee 
be released pending hearing.'97 Some o f  the cases have been especially harsh, resulting in 
long periods of incarceration even for individuals with strong ties to the community and 
little risk of flight.'98 The rationale, of course, is that if the accused flees, then the United 
States will be unable to comply with its treaty commitments. Moreover, since the United 
States depends on the good will of the other nation when it seeks to extradite, the U.S. 
government is often eager to accommodate its treaty partners. This appeared especially true 
in the Tafur case, since the United States was attempting to extradite a significant number of 
individuals from Colombia to the United States to stand trial for narcotics trafficking.'99 
Recently, however, some courts have begun to give more weight to the risk of flight 
and consequently have looked hard at the level of the government's proof.200 For example, 
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana released two detainees on bond 
under "special circ~mstances"~~'  quite similar to those in Tafur's case. Two Mexican 
nationals had been accused by the Mexican government of robbing a bank. The U.S. 
magistrate granted bond, finding that the individuals had "a substantial likelihood of success 
on the merits at the extradition hearing because it appears the government will be unable to 
establish probable cause. . . ."202 The court asserted that "the decision to grant bail and, 
consequently, the determination of what constitutes a 'special circumstance,' is left to the 
sound discretion of the trial judge."203 
The use of provisional detention seems especially questionable in the Tafur case, since 
there was no evidence of urgency-other than the assertions of the Colombian and U.S. 
governments, who labeled him a fugitive. Tafur was in the United States lawfully, under a 
proper student visa, living openly in a university dormitory, and attending law school 
classes. He had filed the proper immigration forms in both Colombia and the United States, 
advising of his whereabouts. When he learned that the Colombian Office of the Special 
Prosecutor was investigating him, he retained an attorney in Colombia and the Special 
Prosecutor granted Tafur's attorney permission to present, by March 3, 2000, his 
exculpatory evidence. Tafur had assembled copies of the financial transactions surrounding 
the checks issued in connection with his transfer of his father's Colombian government 
pension funds to his mother's bank account. But, instead of being allowed to present his 
evidence to the Special Prosecutor in Colombia in order to confirm his innocence, he was 
surveilled for weeks by DEA agents and ultimately arrested. 
Tafur's arrest and detention without bail not only violated the U.S. Constitution, it 
also contravened established human rights norms. It should be noted that, while Tafur was a 
foreign national, a U.S. citizen would have faced the same denial of constitutionally 
197. This doctrine originated almost a century ago when the Supreme Court in Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 
40, 63 (1903), ruled that even though bail should not ordinarily be granted, a court might do so if the case 
presented "special circumstances" that warranted release. 
198. For a summary of the cases and law on this issue, see Wiehl, supra note 8, at 754 n.83. The severity 
with which some courts regard the limitations on bail was illustrated by the case of a Russian official who was 
detained in New York on a Swiss warrant charging bribery. Although the Russian ambassador appeared at the 
detention hearing and pledged that the Russian government would assure the official's appearance, the court 
refused to find "special circumstances" and denied bail. See Alan Feuer, New York Judge Denies Bail to Russian 
Aide in Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,2001, at A3. 
199. The Justice Department attorney estimated that there were approximately sixty individuals in custody in 
Colombia, and that approximately thirty to forty additional provisional arrest warrants were pending. Hearing 
(Apr. 13, 2000), supra note 162, at 14. He noted that it was taking approximately a year from arrest to actual 
extradition for a case to wind its way through the Colombian extradition process. Id. 
200. See, e.g., Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997). 
20 1. See generally In re Ricardo Gonzalez, Victor Huerta, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725 (W.D. La. 1999). 
202. Id. at 728. 
203. Id. at 736. 
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protected rights. The UDHR assures the right to be free of arbitrary arrest and detention,204 
as does the ICCPR.~'~ The American Convention is similar and also emphasizes the right to 
release pending triaLZo6 The European Convention on Extradition addresses provisional 
arrests, providing the possibility of provisional release at any time and specifying that "the 
requested Party shall decide the matter in accordance with its ~aw."~" All of these 
documents and the rights they establish are broadly accepted by the nations of the world and 
set the standard by which the detention of an individual pending extradition proceedings 
should be judged. By these standards, the detention of Victor Tafur was seriously wanting. 
C. Detention in a General Prison 
When bail was denied, ~ a f u r  was remanded to the custody of the U.S. Marshall 
Service as a federal prisoner, but was incarcerated in a state prison, which also raised human 
rights issues. Both Article 10 of the ICCPR and Article 5(4) of the American Convention, 
deal with incarceration of unconvicted  individual^.^'^ The American Convention explicitly 
provides that "[a]ccused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated 
from convicted persons, and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status 
as unconvicted persons."209 While the United States has not ratified the American 
Convention at all and has ratified the ICCPR with re~ervations,~'' these documents represent 
a benchmark by which Tafur's treatment may be measured. Tafur was not housed in a 
federal facility for pretrial detainees, but was, instead, confined for six weeks in a general 
prison of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. For most of the time he was in a cell with 
four or five other inmates, a number of whom were convicted criminals serving their 
sentences. At times he was in general holding cells withas many as a dozen other prisoners. 
He was subjected to the humiliating routines of prison life, including strip searches on 
returning from court. Under the prison's rules, he was held in "quarantine" for the first 
fifteen days of incarceration and denied access to everyone but his attorney. Subsequently, 
he was allowed visits only one hour a week by no more than two people and only limited 
phone calls. Although attempts were made to provide him with his class notes and course 
books so he might maintain his legal studies, almost all were denied to him because his mail 
was rejected in a seemingly arbitrary fashion. He was still suffering from injuries received 
in the plane crash, but received essentially no treatment. Serious back and spine injuries in 
the plane crash even made climbing into a top bunk an ordeal, yet no special 
accommodations were made. When he was transferred to a different correctional faci~ity,~" 
204. UDHR, supra note 105, art. 9. 
205. Id. art. 9. 
206. American Convention, supra note 1 18, art. 7, a 3 ,  5. 
207. European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 1 6 , n  1, 4, Europ. T.S. No. 24, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int~treaty/en/TreatiestmO24.htm The Convention also limits the period of provisional 
detention to forty days, and allows for termination in as little as eighteen days if the request for extradition and 
supporting documents are not forthcoming. Id. 7 4. The Model Treaty on Extradition, does not address the issue 
of bail but does limit detention to forty days. Model Treaty on Extradition, G.A. Res. 4511 16, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Comm., 45th Sess., 68th plen. mtg. at 214, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A145149 (1990), available at 
http://www.uncjin.org/Standards/Rules/rl7/r17.html. , 
208. ICCPR, supra note 114, art. 10; American Convention, supra note 1 18, art. 5 , 7  4. 
209. American Convention, supra note 118, art. 5 , 7  4. 
2 10. U.S. CAT Reservations, supra note 1 19. 
21 1. See Chris Hedges, Policy to Protect Jailed Immigrants is Adopted by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,2001, at 
Al.  The jail in which Tafur spent his last period of incarceration was the subject of complaints by inmates. Id. 
When T a h r  was finally granted bail, after six weeks of incarceration, he was confined to the home of his mother 
and stepfather, with electronic monitoring prohibiting even movement to their adjoining bonsai workshop. See 
Order (Apr. 13,2000), supra note 163, at 1. 
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at a substantial distance from both the court and his home, Tafur was again subjected to a 
quarantine period. 
The American Convention is not the only document establishing rights or providing 
guidance on the treatment of prisoners. The United Nations General Assembly adopted a 
resolution providing guidelines for the treatment of those convicted of crimes or otherwise 
detained.212 Under the principles set down in the resolution, persons in detention are to be 
presumed innocent2I3 and treated as "appropriate to their unconvicted status."214 " Whenever 
possible, they are to be kept separate from convicted prisoners."215 The guidelines presume 
release pending trial, and call for a judicial or other authority able to review continued 
detentiom2I6 Other bodies have adopted rules dealing with prisoners, which include 
separate treatment for unconvicted individuals.217 Obviously the conditions under which 
Tafur was held did not meet "the minimum conditions which are accepted as suitable by the 
United ~a t ions . "~"  T a h r  languished for six weeks in grim conditions until he was released 
to house arrest. The conditions of his incarceration were offensive to human rights norms, 
especially when coupled with a provisional detention without probable cause. 
D. The Immigration and Naturalization Service 
Agents of the INS participated in the detention, questioning, and prosecution of Tafur 
from the time of his arrest. An INS agent, apparently assigned to work with the DEA, was 
present for the initial interrogation and participated throughout the case. When Tafur had 
been incarcerated for several weeks, he 'was served in his jail cell with a notice of 
deportation219 and his student status was revoked. That notice, alleging that he had entered 
the country illegally because he was involved with drug activity in Colombia, relied on the 
same grounds as the extradition warrant.220 The service of the notice appears to have been 
aimed at insuring that if Tafur was released on the extradition warrant, then removal 
proceedings under the immigration laws might be instituted.221 This type of strategy has 
been referred to as "disguised e~tradition,"'~~ and, while it may be legal, it circumvents the 
212. A detained person is defined as "any person deprived of personal liberty except as a result of 
conviction for an offence." Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 431173, U.N. GAOR, 76th plen. mtg., at 298, U.N. Doc. A/Res/43/173 (1988), available 
at http://www.unhchr.ch/htmVmenu3m/h_comp36.htm. 
21 3. Id. principle 36. 
214. Id. principle 8. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. principles 39, 1 l(3). 
217. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted by the First United 
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, and approved 
by the Economic and Social Council by its resolution 663 C (XXN) of July 3 I, 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of May 13, 
1977, 1 85 (1) [hereinafter United Nations Standard Minimum Rules]. The Rules refer to these individuals as 
"untried prisoners" who "are presumed to be innocent and shall be treated as such." Id. 7 84 (1)(2). They are to 
be kept separate from convicted prisoners and enjoy a substantially different regime, including single celling and 
different prison garb. Id. 7785, 86, 88. 
218. Id .12 .  
219. Notice to Appear at 3, In re Tafur-Dominguez (File No. A077 626 394, Case No. PM10003000060) 
(INS Mar. 17,2000) [hereinafter Notice to Appear]. 
220. 8 U.S.C. 5 1229a (2000); Notice to Appear, supra note 219, at 3 (reissued Mar. 31, 2000). No date 
was specified for a hearing, but a detainer was lodged at the jail to ensure that if Tahr  were released on the 
extradition warrant he would be detained for the INS. However, when he released Tafur on bail, the court 
extracted from the government an agreement not to rearrest T a h r  on the INS warrant. The government agreed to 
this in order to avoid an immediate hearing. 
221. 8 U.S.C. fj 1251(a)(2) (1988). 
222. SHEARER, supra note 16, at 78; see also Teny Richard Kane, Prosecuting International Terrorists in 
the United States Courts: Gaining the Jurisdictional Threshold, 12 YALE J .  INT'L L. 294, 333-35 (1987). The 
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extradition process and deprives the extraditee of certain safeguards.223 In the case of Tafur, 
the facts upon which the INS relied in filing its notice were the ones alleged in the 
extradition complaint.224 However, in a removal proceeding the government has the burden 
of demonstrating its case by clear and convincing evidence.225 In this case, the government 
most likely would not have been able to prevail in the removal proceeding once the 
extradition magistrate found that the government could not meet even the threshold standard 
of probable cause. So the only real function of the detainer at that stage of the proceedings 
was to prevent Tafur's release if the extradition magistrate granted However, the 
court, as a condition of giving the government additional time to secure the requisite 
documents from Colombia, released Tafur on bail and extracted from the government an 
agreement not to rearrest him on the immigration matter.227 Had the court not protected him 
in this fashion, the extraditee might have been subjected to further incarceration even though 
the court had found no probable cause to believe that he had engaged in criminal conduct. 
E. Probable Cause to Extradite 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "no [wlarrants shall 
7,228 issue, but upon probable cause . . . . As noted earlier, although the government has 
argued in the past that a traditional showing of probable cause is not required in extradition 
matters, the courts have ruled that the Fourth Amendment protects all persons from arbitrary 
arrest, including persons arrested pursuant to a treaty,229 and that the government must 
conform its conduct to the requirements of the Constitution when carrying out its treaty 
obligations.230 The probable cause issue may arise at two junctures in an extradition case 
because an extraditee is usually arrested on a provisional warrant. Thus, the court must 
consider whether probable cause exists for the detention as well as for the actual surrender. 
While the courts have not developed clear jurisprudence regarding provisional detention, 
the standards appear relatively relaxed, with the courts accepting facsimile copies of 
Interpol arrest warrants.23' Whether this practice meets constitutional standards is open to 
use of immigration proceedings as an alternative to extradition is one of the devices sometimes used to evade the 
extradition process. It simplifies matters for both the requesting and asylum state, since formal extradition 
processes, including a judicial hearing, need not be pursued, and deportation processes contain fewer safeguards 
for the individual. Countries may use other procedures, such as informal rendition, in which the wanted 
individual is simply returned to a common border. 
223. Rebane, supra note 21, at 1671. For example, the dual criminality requirement and the "doctrine of 
specialty" might be avoided. 
224. Complaint, supra note 150, at 1-3; Notice (Mar. 17, 2000) at 3 (listing the facts). 
225. 8 U.S.C. 5 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2000). 
226. The INS tiled a detainer with the prison so that if Tafur was released on the extradition charge he would 
continue to be detained on the INS notice. See Hearing (Apr. 13,2000), supra note 162, at 3 1. 
227. Hearing (Apr. 13, 2000), supra note 162, at 36-40. After the magistrate denied extradition, the INS 
warrant was still pending. However, the INS took no immediate action. This left Tafur with the possibility that he 
might be rearrested at any time. Hearing (May 3 ,  2000), supra note 150, at 76. Several months later, after he 
requested clarification of his student status, the INS confirmed that he was in status. Letter from M. Frances 
Holmes, Acting District Director, Immigration and Naturalization S ~ N . ,  Philadelphia Distict, to Joseph A. Tate, 
Attorney for Victor Manuel Tafur (July 22, 2000) (on file with the author) (notice that Tafur's student visa was 
reinstated). The magistrate stated that he did not want Tafur "whisked out of the country without the due process" 
to which the court deemed him entitled. Hearing (Apr. 13, 2000), supra note 162, at 34. In spite of the judge's 
efforts Tafur was rearrested and briefly detained aftcr the hearing. 
228. U.S. CONST. amend. N. 
229. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1957). 
230. Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 348 (4th Cir. 1983). 
23 1. See Russo, supra note 191, at 1058. 
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question, as demonstrated by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Parretti v. United In 
the case of Victor Tafur, the government simply alleged that he had withdrawn money from 
his account and paid it to drug interests-with no supporting detail. While it  would 
certainly not support a warrant application in a domestic criminal case, it is apparently the 
kind of evidence that is accepted on a regular basis by courts on requests for provisional 
detention.233 
At an extradition hearing, probable cause is measured by the federal standard used in 
preliminary hearings.234 It is established "when the evidence presented supports a 
reasonable belief that a figitive committed the charged offenses."235 Thus, probable cause 
signifies evidence "sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to 
conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused's guilt."236 As courts have 
explained: 
Probable cause means more than opportunity to commit crime or presence in a 
particular place. It must be more than surmise or suspicion. There must be some 
tangible fact or incident which will support a judicial act, something which 
invokes discrimination of judicial di~cret ion.~~'  
In Victor Tafur's case, the Department of Justice, on behalf of the Colombian 
government, contended that Tafur had helped to finance a drug shipment through the 
dummy corporation, E.I. Caribe. The evidence to support this charge was supplied by the 
Colombian prosecutor, not by U.S. sources. The allegations were set forth in Colombian 
documents that summarized evidence against a number of parties. As for Tafur, the 
Colombian prosecutor stated that T a h r  had drawn a number of checks to two individuals. 
Some of the checks were endorsed over to other a not uncommon procedure in 
~ o l o m b i a , ~ ~ ~  even though Tafur had marked them for deposit only.240 One was then 
232. Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997). 
233. See Russo, supra note 191, at 1058. 
234. Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 175 (2d Cir. 1980). Courts for the most part apply the federal 
standard for probable cause. See, e.g., Greci v. Birknes, 527 F.2d 956, 958 (1st Cir. 1976); Coleman v. Burnett, 
477 F.2d 1187, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
Some courts have employed applied state law. See, e.g., In re Shapiro, 352 F. Supp. 641, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); 
United States ex rel. Karadzole v. ArtukoviC, 170 F. Supp. 383, 388-89 (S.D. Cal. 1959); Non-Contradiction, 
supra note 48, at 1303 n.39, 13 1 1 n.72. 
235. In re Extradition of Gunther Lehming, 951 F. Supp. 505, 514 (D. Del. 1996); see also In re Marzook, 
924 F. Supp. 565,579 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
236. Coleman, 477 F.2d at 1202. 
237. Reis v. United States Marshal, 192 F. Supp. 79, 82 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 
292 F. 491, 493 (D. Wash. 1923)). "In order to determine probable cause, a judge must review the evidence 
presented and make an independent determination that the accused committed the crimes alleged." In re 
Extradition of Gunther Lehming, 951 F. Supp. at 514. The review is to assure that the magistrate does not "serve 
merely as a rubber stamp" but actually performs a "'neutral and detached' function." Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 
108, 1 I I, (1964). Thus, a judge "should not accept without question the complainant's mere conclusion that the 
person whose arrest is sought has committed a crime." Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480,486 (1958). 
238. Investigation of the Legal Status of Victor Manuel Tahr-Dominguez at Summary of the Investigation, 
Delegate Prosecutor's office to Criminal in and for the Circuit v. Jose Villeros, Ricardo Estrada et al. (Dec. 3 1, 
1999) (file no. 35575) (official trans.) (on file with author) [hereinafter Investigation of the Legal Status]. 
According to Colombian law, the actions and responsibilities of the endorser of a check are not imputed to the 
creator or writer of the check. See generally Code of Commerce of Colombia. 
239. See Decreto 410 of 1971, art. 654 (Mar. 27 1971). 
240. Hearing (May 3, 2000), supra note 150, at 47. Endorsed checks are sometimes treated as money. 
Jared Kotler, Extradition Case Stirs Support in Colombia, T H E  INTELLIGENCE RECORD, Apr. 23, 2000, at 
www.phillyburbs.com/intelligenceerecord/sall7 15427.htm. 
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reindorsed to E.I. ~ a r i b e . ~ ~ '  The Justice Department was careful not to say that Tafur had 
directly given money to E.I. Caribe, and no evidence was presented that showed that he had 
any connection to the company. The Colombian government came forward with no 
evidence to link Tafur to the illicit activities undertaken by E.I. Caribe. 
To bolster the case against Tafur, the Colombian papers identified one of the 
individuals in the exchange transaction as "prone to crime."242 The prosecutors described a 
second individual as someone "engaged in unclear transactions in representation of third 
parties whom they don't know."243 Thus, the document concludes that "transactions that 
lack of proper formalities, payment, uncertain loans and drawers and beneficiaries of 
securities used . . . lead to infer[ring] the intention of hiding the source of origin of the 
money 
Finally, the documents allege that "[ulp to now, the money transference by TAFUR to 
E.I. CARIBE had no licit explanation if we do take into account his work," apparently 
implying that Tafur had gained the money from illicit activity connected to his position as a 
government official.245 Illicit enrichment is a charge commonly used against corrupt 
officials, but that was not the crime with which Tafur was charged and this allegation did 
not support a finding of probable cause for drug trafficking.246 
241. Several checks were reindorsed to an individual and a corporation having connections with E.I. Caribe, 
although there was no indication that these checks ever reached E.1. Caribe. Amici Memorandum of Law, supra 
note 32, at 8-9. Two other checks wound up in the hands of an individual who used them to purchase an 
automobile for a third party. Id. These are the only allegations in the Colombian papers relating to Tafur. Id. 
The Colombian prosecutor attempted to draw conclusions that seemed unwarranted from the few facts set 
forth in the papers. Referring to the purchase by an endorsee of an automobile for a third party, the prosecutors 
claimed that this showed Tafur's guilt since "nobody is going to draw checks to buy an expensive MERCEDES 
BENZ that isn't registered to his name." Id. The court was being asked to draw the conclusion that because a 
check drawn by Victor Tafur was eventually used by someone else as partial payment for an automobile for yet a 
third party, Tafur must be a drug dealer. See id. But that check was given to the businessman with whom Tafur 
exchanged funds, who subsequently endorsed it to a second person, who used it to purchase the car. See id. This 
appears to involve a rather large leap of logic. ' 
242. Investigation of the Legal Status, supra note 238, at Findings. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. In a seeming inconsistency the documents note that the money came from the account of the 
Colombian Congress, id., and was the pension of Tahr 's father, an assassinated Colombian Senator. Hearing 
(May 3,2000), supra note 150, at 32-33. 
246. Both the crime alleged by the government, ,and the crime with which Victor Tafur would likely have 
been charged if extradited, fail the required test of "dual criminality." Amici Memorandum of Law, supra note 
32, at 19. The Extradition Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Colombia explicitly applies to 
"(a) Offenses described in the Appendix to this Treaty which are punishable under the laws of both Contracting 
Parties; or (b) Offenses, whether listed in the Appendix to this Treaty or not, provided they arepunishable under 
the Federal laws of the United States and the laws of the Republic of Colombia." U.S.-Colombia Extradition 
Treaty, supra note 43, art. 2 , l  1 (emphasis added). 
To satisfy the dual criminality requirement, the treaty offense must be punishable in both the asylum country 
and the requesting country. Id.; United States v. Bogue, No. 98-572-M, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784 (E.D. Pa. 
1998). There is no crime of illicit enrichment in the Unjted States, and could never be one because it imposes an 
unconstitutional necessity for self-incrimination. See Lucinda A. Low et al., The Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption: A Comparison with the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VA. J .  INT'L L. 243, 
281-82 (1998). In fact, the main objection of the United States to the adoption of the currently proposed Inter- 
American Convention Against Corruption, a treaty that mandates that the parties adopt the crime of illicit 
enrichment, is the fact that the, crime would be unconstitutional. See id. "The U.S. delay in signing the 
Convention has been justified by the possible inconsistency of this latter requirement with the constitutional 
protection in the U.S. against self-incrimination." Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Corfuption-A General Review with an 
Emphasis on the Role of the World Bank, 15 DICK. J .  INT'L L. 45 l , 4 7  1 (1996). 
Under the law of Colombia, a person charged with illicit enrichment bears the burden of proof of showing that 
the money in question was the product of legal activities. The shift in the burden of proof in Colombia is effected 
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Exchange transactions of the type in which Tafur engaged are routine in Colombia, 
and because of the potential for money laundering, he took pains to find reputable parties to 
deal with in making the exchange and he marked the checks to prohibit reindorsement. 
Although some of the procedures may seem odd by U.S. banking standards, they were 
commonplace and fully legal in Colombia. And most crucially, all of the pension money 
was promptly transferred to his mother's bank, as is documented by bank records. The 
money could not, therefore, have been used to finance the drug deal. 
Nonetheless, the Colombian prosecutors issued an arrest warrant for Tafur based on no 
more than the reindorsed checks and their desire to investigate further. While it may be 
acceptable in Colombia to arrest for investigation, it does not pass constitutional muster in 
the United States. Nor does it meet the requirements of the U.S.-Colombia Extradition 
Treaty, which provides that the standards of the requested state are to be applied, which in 
the United States means probable cause must be 
Tafur's situation was analogous to that examined by the court in In re Extradition of 
Gunther Lehrning, who was accused of bankruptcy fraud and related offenses.248 Lehming 
challenged the government's evidence, arguing that it did not show that he acted with the 
requisite fraudulent intent, and that it did not implicate him personally in the criminal 
activity.249 The warrant of arrest advised that Lehming "is strongly suspected of committing 
these offenses, on the grounds of several witness statements. . . as well as on the basis of 
documents (accounting records, invoices, and other)."250 The court found that this warrant 
did not provide sufficient factual detail to allow the court to conclude that probable cause 
existed.'" Further, an affidavit submitted by the trustee in bankruptcy, a report prepared by 
the trustee, contracts, and other documents examined by the court failed to support probable 
cause.252 The court found that it had not been "provided sufficient factual information 
regarding the subject matter of the contracts, the method by which liabilities were 
fictitiously increased or the benefit derived therefrom."253 Further, "Lehming's alleged 
involvement, knowledge, and/or acquiescence is not discussed."254 The court acknowledged 
that bankruptcy fraud is commonly proven by circumstantial evidence, but that "the 
[glovemment has not provided sufficient factual evidence supporting" its claim.255 
notwithstanding provisions in the Colombian Constitution that "[elvery person is presumed innocent until he has 
been proven guilty by a court ofjustice." CONST. COLOM. art. 29. No such exception would be permissible under 
the U.S. Constitution because the Fifth Amendment explicitly protects an individual from self-incrimination and 
has been interpreted to include a presumption of innocence. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Quinn v. United States, 
349 U.S. 155, 161-62 (1955). 
247. See generally In re Extradition of Gunther Lehming, 951 F. Supp. 505, 5 13-15 (D. Del. 1996). The 
United States has an obligation to ensure that when it seeks an arrest warrant on behalf of a foreign nation, the 
warrant application meets constitutional standards. See Paretti v. United States, 112 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1997). 
Regarding Tafur, the prosecutors recognized the insufficiency of the allegations and asked Colombia for 
additional information. Hearing (Apr. 13, 2000), supra note 162, at 38. Justice officials even stated publicly that 
they were not vouching for the Colombian allegations. Waller, supra note 148 at 18. They nonetheless went 
fonvard with the extradition. 
248. In re Extradition of Gunther Lehrning, 95 1 F. Supp. 5 10. 
249. Id. at 508, 515. 
250. Id. at 516. 
25 1. Id. 
252. Id. at 517. 
253. Id. at 518. 
254. In re Extradition of Gunther Jxhming, 951 F. Supp. 505, 518 (D. Del. 1996). 
255. Id. at 518. In situations less extreme than the situation here, federal courts have declined to extradite. 
A federal Magistrate in Newark, New Jersey, declined to extradite former Mexican Attorney General Mario Ruiz 
Massieu, on the grounds that no probable cause existed since the witness affidavits from Mexico were "incredible 
and unreliable." Ruiz-Massieu v. Reno, 9 15 F. Supp. 68 1, 688 (D.N.J. 1996), rev 'd, Ruiz-Massieu v. Reno, 9 1 
F.3d 416, 418 (3d Cir. 1996). The decision is unreported but chronicled in later habeas corpus proceedings. Id.; 
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In Tafur's case, the government's arrest warrant contained only bald allegations of his 
culpability, unsupported by actual evidence. The government presented no affidavits, 
deposition testimony, or other competent evidence that could provide the court with a 
"substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]" that probable cause  exist^."^ Read most generously, 
the facts alleged in the complaint showed that Victor Tafur withdrew the Colombian 
government's pension money from his bank account in pesos, wrote checks to exchange 
those pesos for dollars, and that some of the checks, after being reindorsed, wound up 
related to the account of a corporation that apparently was involved in illicit drug activity. 
That alone would not demonstrate any culpability on the part of Tafur. 
Moreover, the explanatory evidence offered by Tafur demonstrated that the elements 
of a prima facie case were wanting.257 Tafur wrote checks marked to prevent endorsement, 
and all of the money he removed from his account was transferred to that of his mother. 
The checks were reindorsed by third parties unbeknownst to Tafur and in spite of his 
precautions. Thus, the case presented against Victor Tafur was substantially less than that 
found wanting by the court in Lehming. The magistrate judge agreed with the assertions on 
Tafur's behalf and found no probable cause. 
F. Evidentiary Issues 
As indicated previously, an extradition hearing is typically likened to a preliminary 
hearing in a domestic criminal case, where the primary function is to determine whether 
sufficient evidence exists to hold a defendant for trial.258 While this analogy may be 
superficially satisfying, an extradition hearing provides little of the protections secured to an 
individual at a preliminary examination in a criminal case. In a normal criminal case, 
federal law requires a prompt determination of probable cause if the accused is in 
the accused is entitled to a certain amount of discovery,260 and most 
constitutional protections apply.261 This differs substantially from extradition proceedings, 
where discovery is usually not availab~e,'~' the right to confront and examine witnesses is 
severely limited,263 and the standard of probable cause may be less stringent.264 
Magistrates, in determining probable cause in an extradition hearing, typically 
rec~gnize that they may exercise some discretion in the amount of evidence they receive,265 
see also Borderless Crime, supra note 138, at 1619; R.L. Jackson & J. Darling, US Judge Won't Extradite 
Former Mexico Official, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 1995, at Al .  
256. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960); see also Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758, 799 
(9th Cir. 1997). 
257. See In re Okeke, No. 96-7019P-01, 1996 WL 622213 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 1996). 
258. Merino v. United States Marshall, 326 F.2d 5, 12 (9th Cir. 1963). 
259. See cases cited supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also FED R. CRIM. P. 5(c). 
260. See FED.  R. CRIM.  P. 5.l(a). 
26 1. BASSIOUNI, I TERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note I, at 702-6 1. 
262. When Victor Tafur's defense counsel sought discovery from the government it was refused on the 
grounds that there is no statutory or treaty basis for discovery in extradition matters. Letter from Virgil B. Walker, 
Assistant U.S. Attorney, to Joseph A. Tate (Apr. 5,2000) (refusing discovery) (on file with the author). 
263. BASSIOUNI, I TERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 1, at 708. 
264. "Extradition law [I8  U.S.C. 5 3190 (1988)l permits the requesting country to introduce evidence ex 
parte in the requesting country, while those same ex parte opportunities are unavailable to the accused. 
Additionally, the requesting country need not set forth the crime for which the fugitive was indicted with any 
particularity or produce an authentic copy of the arrest warrant." Bifani, supra note 37, at 643 (citing Grin v. 
Shine, 187 U.S. 181 (1902)). 
265. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447,461 (1913). Admissibility of evidence presented by the government is 
governed specifically by 18 U.S.C. 5 3190 (1995). 
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but deem such discretion limited in its nature and scope. They hold that an individual facing 
extradition is permitted to introduce evidence that refutes the finding of probable cause266 by 
offering evidence that explains the circumstances before the court or clarifies the 
government's proof.267 But evidence generally may not be offered to contradict testimony, 
challenge the credibility of witnesses, or establish a defense to the crimes alleged.268 This is 
referred to as the "rule of non-c~ntradict ion."~~~ Indeed, some courts may go so far as to 
hold that the affidavits or other testimony of government witnesses must be taken as true in 
the extradition process.270 
The rationale for the rule of non-contradiction is straightforward, since the extradition 
hearing is not intended to be a trial on the merits, but merely a hearing on the existence of 
probable cause.27' The requesting state generally need not provide any more than record 
evidence, since to do otherwise would present severe logistical problems and undercut the 
whole purpose of having an extradition treaty.272 Requiring the requesting nation to present 
a substantial amount of evidence could hamper efforts to return individuals to the requesting 
state to face criminal charges. Moreover, the asylum state, acting on behalf of the 
requesting state, wishes to see that the hearing proceeds expeditiously, since it is in its own 
self-interest to be cooperative to ensure that the cooperation will be reciprocal. 
Under the rule of non-contradiction, however, a court may admit evidence that might 
explain ambiguities or doubtful elements of the government's prima facie case.273 The 
precise boundary is murky between evidence that contradicts the government's proof and 
that which merely explains it. This rule, if strictly applied, can lead to oppressive and unfair 
results because even the most incredible government evidence and affiants must be 
accepted, while seemingly credible evidence put forth by the accused may have to be 
rejected. As a result, the courts have sometimes stretched the limits in finding evidence 
explanatory rather than contradictory274 and recognized that the hearing must comport with 
due process.275 Thus, some courts have created a caveat to the rule, under which "evidence 
266. Collins v. Loisel, 42 U.S. 309, 316 (1922); Charlfon, 229 U.S. at 461; In re Extradition of Gunther 
Lehming, 951 F. Supp. 505, 514 (D. Del. 1996); In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re 
Wedge, 15 F. 864,866 (S.D.N.Y. 1883). 
267. Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419,429 (5th Cir. 1999). 
268. Sindona, 450 F. Supp. at 685. 
269. See Non-Contradicfion, supra note 48. 
270. See In re Mahmoud Abed Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032, 1050-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Pineda Lara, No. 
97 Cr. Misc. 1 (THK), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1777, at 25 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1998); see also Non-Contradiction, 
supra note 48, at 1299 n.20. 
271. Collins, 262 U.S. 426; Charlton, 229 U.S. at 461; In re Wadge, 15 F. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1883). 
272. See Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 51 1, 517 (1916); In re Orteiza y Cortes, 136 U.S. 330, 337 (1890); 
112 re Wadge, 15 F. 864; see also Non-Contradiction, supra note 48, at 1301 11.27. 
273. In re Okeke, No. 96-7019P-01, 1996 WL 62221 3 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 1996). 
274. See, e.g., In re Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725 (W.D. La. 1999). Alibi evidence has typically been found 
to be contradictory rather than explanatory. Gonzalez was the first case to go so far as to admit this type of 
evidence. See also Non-Contradiction, supra note 48, at 1299. 
275. United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 106 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 
206 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Non-Contradiction, supra note 48, at 1300 n.23. One author has pointed out the 
problems that arise when the line between facts and conclusions is blurred. Under the inquisitorial system in 
many civil code countries, the investigating judicial official may compel testimony and the production of 
documents, and may issue a charge or warrant. Most U.S. courts decline to accept the conclusions of the official 
as "facts" which may not be contradicted. Non-Contradiction, supra note 48, at 1304-05 & nn.42-45. 
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that would completely negate probable cause,"276 or that would obliterate "the requisite 
elements" has been held admissible.277 
In the case of Victor Tafur, the rule of non-contradiction posed problems for the 
defense. At the hearing the government introduced the documents supplied by Colombia 
and argued that they demonstrated probable cause sufficient to believe that Tafur had helped 
finance the drug shipment seized in Cartegena. The government's evidence consisted of the 
checks that had been written by Tafur to a Colombian businessman, Rafael McCausland, 
and one of his associates. Tafur had been put in touch with the businessman by the 
president of a stock exchange house, Rafael Piedrahita; McCausland was his client. 
Piedrahita took the checks that Tafur wrote and held them until wire confirmation was 
received that the money had been transferred to Tafur's mother's account. He then turned 
them over to a messenger sent to his office by ~ c ~ a u s l a n d . ~ ~ ~  However, as part of the 
government's extradition package, an affidavit from Piedrahita was included, averring that 
he did not know whether the transaction had been completed.279 The government insisted 
that the affidavit showed that Tafur's story was not the truth and that he was in league with 
the drug traffickers. 
In challenging the government's case, T a h r  took the stand and testified to the events 
that led to the writing and transmitting of the checks. In so doing, his counsel introduced 
copies of bank statements and faxes from the bank and from Piedrahita to explain how the 
transaction occurred and identify the parties involved. Problems arose, however, when 
Tafur's counsel attempted to introduce an affidavit from Piedrahita made subsequent to the 
one submitted by the government; this statement went further in concurring with Tafur's 
description of the facts and acknowledged that Piedrahita had, in fact, given Tafur's checks 
to McCausland's messenger.280 At that point, the government objected, and the judge ruled 
that the affidavit was contradictory, rather than explanatory and refused to admit it.281 But 
the two affidavits were by the same individual and, if one of the primary reasons for 
rejecting "contradictory evidence" is the desire to avoid issues of then it seems 
that affidavits by the same individual may not raise that issue to the same extent as 
testimony by different witnesses.283 In fact, courts have sometimes allowed the introduction 
of recantations by which would seem to carry the admission of "contradictory" 
evidence one step further than the amplified statement proffered by Tafur. 
276. Sandhu v. Burke, 97 Civ. 4608, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 3584, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2000). One 
commentator has argued that this standard originated with a misreading of language in In re Sindona, 450 F. 
Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), and that the court in Sindona did not intend to expand "explanatory" evidence to 
include contradictory evidence which negates probable cause. Non-Contradiction, supra note 48, at 1316. 
277. See In re Okeke, 1996 WL 6222 13 at * 11. Semmelman makes a similar argument, that the court did 
not intend to expand the accused's right to present evidence, regarding the "obliterate" standard. Non- 
Contradiction, supra note 48, at 13 15. 
278. Hearing (May 3, 2000), supra note 150, at 40-42, 53. 
279. Id. at 52-53. 
280. Id. at SO. 
281. Id. at 52-53. 
282. Id. at 50. 
283. ' h e r e  is, admittedly, a discrepancy between the first and second affidavits, perhaps explained by 
Piedrahita's initial desire to not appear too involved with McCausland. Piedrahita's second affidavit is more 
forthcoming in describing the transaction. It is not surprising that he might choose to be less than forthcoming in 
a situation where he might himself be accused of participating in the drug scheme, especially in Colombia, where 
anyone with even a small amount of knowledge concerning a narcotics scheme may be in danger and subject to 
reprisals. See, e.g., COLOMBIA: T H E  RIGHT TO JUSTICE, supra note 172. 
284. See, e.g., Maguna-Celaya v. Haro, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 1998); In re Extradition of Contreras, 
800 F. Supp. 1462 (S.D. Tex. 1992); Republic of France v. Moghadam, F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (In all 
- ~ 
three cases, the courts denied extradition finding the recantation of witnesses more credible than their original 
statements). 
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In this case the magistrate's rejection of the defense's affidavit was not determinative, 
since the judge appeared to base his ruling solely on the failure of the government's 
evidence to demonstrate probable cause. That ruling did, nevertheless, depend on the 
introduction of evidence by Tafhr showing that all of the money had been received in his 
mother's account shortly after he made the transfer. None of the defense records were 
certified, and the government argued strenuously that they were fraudulent.285 Nonetheless, 
the court considered them explanatory, rather than contradictory. However, in a closer case, 
the exclusion of the affidavit could well have made a difference, and the rule of non- 
contradiction would have worked to the severe disadvantage of the extraditee. 
The rule of non-contradiction serves a practical purpose; however, if strictly applied, 
the rule can deny an individual the opportunity to provide evidence to negate probable 
cause. The result may be the continuing incarceration of the accused, transfer as a prisoner 
in custody to the requesting nation, and lengthy incarceration awaiting trial. Such treatment 
runs counter to principles of human rights that emphasize individual liberty and freedom 
from unjust detention. It is especially problematic in this age of rapid communication, 
which expedites the transfer of information and could enable prompt verification of at least 
certain types of evidence.286 
G. The Rule of Non-inquiry 
Traditionally, federal courts have been urged to follow the "rule of non-inquiry" 
regarding the conditions in the state that seeks to extradite a person from the United 
This means that the court does not inquire into the human rights conditions and 
the quality of justice in the requesting nation, deeming both of those issues a political and 
foreign policy matter for the secretary of state.288 Prior to World War 11, this rule of non- 
inquiry had some justification in concepts of comity and deference to the sovereignty of 
other states. However, the establishment of the international law of human rights after 
World War I1 fhndamentally changed the basis for that doctrine, and modem legal scholars 
, 
have argued that the policy reasons that once supported the extreme deference to an 
extradition request no longer justify an unreasoned application of the rule of n ~ n - i n ~ u i r y . ~ ~ ~  
Human rights laws apply to all UN Member Accordingly, courts have a duty 
to inquire into the implied and actual threats to an accused's life if a state requests to 
extradite that individual. At least some courts have found a basis for this conclusion in 
concepts of due process under the U.S. ~ o n s t i t u t i o n . ~ ~ '  The Federal Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, for example, declined to extradite individuals whom Mexico sought, 
285. Hearing (May 3,2000), supra note 150, at 14-16. 
286. The magistrate in the Tafur case noted that the U.S.-Colombia Extradition Treaty was written in 1979 
and that conditions had changed. He questioned the need for a sixty-day period in the "information age." 
Hearing (Apr. 13, 2000), supra note 162, at 25. 
287. This rule originated early in the last century in the case of Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901). 
288. See Shea, supra note 142, at 93; Non-Inquiry, supra note 13, at 752-54. 
289. See David B. Sullivan, Abandoning the Rule ofNon-Inquiry in International Extradition, 15 HASTINGS 
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 1 1 (1999); Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non- 
Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL . REV. 1 198 (1 991); see also Non-Inquiry, supra 
note 13. Wilson questioned the objectivity of the U.S. government when it both prosecutes the extradition case on 
behalf of the requesting state, then must pass judgment on its observance of human rights norms. Id. at 755. See 
generally Shca, supra note 142. 
290. Mitchell A. Meyers, Note & Comment, A Defense of Unilateral or Multi-Lateral Intervention Where a 
Violation of International Human Rights Law by a State Constitutes an Implied Waiver of Sovereignty, 3 ILSA J .  
INT'L & COMP. L. 895, 901 (1997). 
291. See, e.g., In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1484-85 (7th Cir. 1984); Nicosia v. Wall, 442 F.2d 1005, 1006- 
07 (5th Cir. 1971); Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960). 
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reasoning that conditions in Mexico violated basic human rights to such an extent that their 
due process would be denied.292 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit held that a federal court may 
not extradite a person when it would violate his constitutional rights to do while the 
Seventh Circuit ruled that extradition may not violate the fundamental values of "fair play 
and decency" embodied in constitutional due process of law.294 This concern for human 
rights and due process is not a recent development; as far back as forty years ago, the 
Second Circuit asserted in Gallina v. Fraser that "[wle can imagine situations where the 
relator, upon extradition, would be subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a 
federal court's sense of decency as to require reexamination of the principle [of the rule of 
non-inquiry] set out above."295 
The United States has recognized that, in some circumstances, it has an obligation to 
inquire into the treatment which an individual will receive if transferred to another nation. 
Article 9 of the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Hostage 
ratified by the United States in 1984, requires that extradition: 
shall not be granted if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for 
believing: (a)   hat the request. . . has been made for the purpose of prosecuting 
or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin 
or political opinion; or (b) That the person's position may be prejudiced (i) for 
any of the reasons mentioned in subparagraph (a).297 
In the case of Colombia, the dangers facing an individual returned to that country are 
well documented. Colombia is a desperately troubled nation. As the oldest democracy in 
Latin America, it has been battered by four decades of civil strife and political violence, 
which have been fueled by vast amounts of drug money.298 The Andean Commission of 
Jurists has found that political violence and common crimes have been aggravated by the 
guerrilla movement, drug trafficking, and terrorism.299 The violence escalates, with left- 
wing guerrillas, who are funded by the drug trade, battling right-wing paramilitary groups, 
who are also supported by drug interests and by some of the Colombian armed forces.300 
Both factions engage in kidnapping and extortion.301 There were several thousand reported 
kidnappings each year, and the murder rate is ten times that of the United Paid 
292. Rosado v. Civiletti, 62 1 F.2d 1 179, 1 182 (2d Cir. 1980). 
293. Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1983). 
294. See In re Burt, 737 F.2d at'l482. 
295. Gallina, 278 F.2d at 79. One commentator has suggested that "the [non-inquiry] practice is 
sufficiently uneven to cast doubt as to its existence." Quigley, supra note 42, at 438; see M. Cherif Bassouni, 
Extradition Reform Legislation in the Untied States: 1981-1983, 17 AKRON L. REV. 495,571 (1984). 
296. See International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 4, 1979, art. 9, 18 I.L.M. 1456. 
297. Id.; see also Non-Inquity, supra note 13, at 761-62. 
298. See COLOMBIA: THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE, supra note 172, at I, 2 1. 
299. Id. at 16-3 1. 
300. The guemlla forces number as many as 17,000 and control substantial areas of Colombia. They are as 
well, or better, equipped than the military, with helicopters and probably surface-to-air missiles. Their war chest 
is in the hundreds of millions of dollars. See 1999 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 156. Added to that, Colombia 
suffers from an unemployment rate of as high as twenty percent, and the country is in the throes of the worst 
recession in seventy years. Id.; Juan Forero, Europe's Aid Plan for Colombia Falls Short of Drug War's Goals, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2000, at A12. To top it off, corruption abounds. See generally Wellstone, supra note 156, 
at A31. The country's last president, Ernesto Samper, was accused of taking campaign contributions from 
narcotraff~ckers. Esquirol, supra note 156, at 31-32. All of this has resulted in an exodus from the country of 
hundreds of thousands of Colombians, from all social and economic strata. See generally Wellstone, supra note 
156, at A31. 
301. See Wellstone, supra note 156, at A31; 1999 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 156, at 21-24. 
302. See id. 
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assassins are common, and in Tafur's home of Cali, a third of the murders for which there 
was information were by paid killers.303 The paramilitary forces, which are often sanctioned 
by the army,)04 and other groups are accused of gross human rights violations by Human 
Rights Watch, a non-governmental organization that monitors human rights issues.305 The 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights reports that the paramilitaries' 
primary method of operation, indeed their military strategy, is the killing of defenseless 
The groups linked to drug trafficking are extremely powerful and have been 
responsible for the murders of prosecutors and judges investigating their activities, 
government ministers, prominent journalists, and others.)07 The U.S. Department of State's 
1999 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for Colombia, in forty-five excruciatingly 
detailed pages, sets forth innumerable instances of political and other extrajudicial killings, 
denials of fair public trials and other individual rights, and numerous other human rights 
abuses.308 The report noted that, although there is an independent civilian judicial system, 
judges, witnesses, and prosecutors are commonly bribed or intimidated.)09 According to 
human rights groups, the courts violate individuals' fundamental rights to due process and 
may deny the right to a public triaL3I0 According to a scholar from the Lawyers Committee 
for Human Rights, defendants are held without formal charges for an average of fourteen 
rnonth~.~" In 1995, the UN Committee Against Torture reviewed Colombia's efforts to 
bring itself in line with the Hostage Convention, stating that it recognized that a "'climate of 
widespread violence' provoked by insurgents, drug-traffickers[,] and armed civilian groups" 
kept Colombia from fully implementing the  onv vent ion.^" The Committee also noted 
problems with the judicial system and widespread impunity from prosecution on the part of 
those responsible for torture and other inhumane treatment.)') 
In the "faceless courts," the prosecutors have many procedural advantages and can 
make the task of defending an accused arduous. Anonymous informants are common, and 
an individual may be arrested and held for years while the investigates the 
charges.)I4 The accused may not be fully informed of the charges, the allegations may be 
changed as the process continues, and during the whole procedure attorneys for the accused 
may be kept in the dark. They may have to ittend repeated depositions of witnesses, if they 
receive notice, but may have no opportunity to cross-examine those One 
scholar, who is familiar with the system, observed that the prosecutors have supplanted 
judges and that the term "judicial" refers to the The trial phase is largely a 
303. See COLOMBIA: THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE, supra note 172, at 133-34. 
304. See Juan Forero, Rightist Squads in Colombia Beating the Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,2000, at A14. 
305. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLOMBIA'S KILLER NETWORKS, THE MILITARY-PA~AM~LITARY 
PARTNERSHIP AND THE UNITED STATES (1996). 
306. High Commissiot~er 's Report, supra note 174,788. 
307. Id. at 133-34. In Cali, Victor Tafur's home, according to the Commission to study violence, "of 120 
homicides for which information was available, 44 (34%) were committed by paid assassins." COLOMBIA: THE 
RIGHT TO JUSTICE, supra note 172, at 133-34. 
308. 1999 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 156. The annual country reports prepared by the State Department 
are thorough and detailed compilations of human rights and country conditions. They are generally considered a 
model of accuracy and fairness. Wilson, Non-Inquiry, supra note 13, at 755. 
309. 1999 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 156, at 28. 
3 10. Id. at 4. 
3 1 1. Weiner, supra note 173, at 36. 
3 12. Press Release HRl4245, Committee Against Torture, Committee Against Torture Concludes Review of 
Colombia's Report (Nov. 24, 1995), at http:Nwww.un.orglNews/Press/docsl1995/19951124.hr4245.html (last 
visited Feb. 8,2002) (on file with author). 
313. Id. 
3 14. See Weiner, supra note 173, at 3 1-32. 
315. Id. 
316. Id. at 33. 
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paper-shuffling exercise, so that "prosecutors are the judges, and the real judges are largely 
window dressing."317 
In the case of Victor Tafur, it is likely that if he were returned to Colombia, his life 
would be in danger. Tafur's father was threatened with death for his role in presenting the 
U.S.-Colombia Extradition Treaty to the Senate of Colombia for ratification and was later 
murdered. The family was threatened if it tried to pursue an investigation into the murder, 
and Tafur lived under armed guard. Tafur, who subsequently worked in a Colombian 
program to eliminate drug crops, became unwittingly enmeshed in a drug-related money- 
laundering scheme. There were subsequent threats, and the Justice Department 
acknowledged in Tafur's extradition proceedings that at least a dozen people connected to 
the scheme had been murdered.318 The ability of the Colombian government to protect 
Tafur should he be returned to that country is in serious question.319 I 
Clearly, the justice system in Colombia is reeling from the political turmoil and 
violence.320 Moreover, political considerations may have affected the Colombian 
government's decision to seek Tafur's extradition. At the time of Tafur's arrest, the U.S. 
Congress was considering major funding to assist the government of Colombia with 
combating narcotics trafficking, and both the U.S. government and that of Colombia were 
publicly highlighting the severity of the narcotics trafficking problems and the efforts being 
made to address them.321 Moreover, Tafur's case is complicated by the political alignments 
involved. Under Colombian law,'the special prosecutor is designed to be an' independent 
official, free of the executive branch, in somewhat the same fashion as independent 
prosecutors under the U.S. system.322 However, parallels with U.S. law are not complete. 
3 17. Id. 
3 18. Hearing (Apr. 13, 2000), supra note 162, at 17-18. 
319. In addition to being potentially subjected to corrupt prosecutors and judicial officials, Tafur would 
undoubtedly face imprisonment if returned to Colombia. Prisons in Colombia are overcrowded and dangerous, 
and prison guards and officials often are corrupt. 1999 C O W R Y  REPORT, supra note 156. Due to all these 
factors, it certainly appears that the threat to his life would be substantial. 
320. The extradition treaty, which Victor Tahr 's father helped to pass twenty years ago in order to extradite 
Colombians to face charges in the United States, led to social and political tension. See Nagle, supra note 152, at 
851 n.1, 865-67. A bloody confrontation with drug traffickers (the "Extraditables"), who rightly feared their 
surrender to the American authorities, ensued. See MARQUEZ, supra note 152, at 22. In addition, bloody 
confrontations between leftist guerrillas and government forces left many dead. They culminated in the 1985 
seizure of the Palace of Justice by a guerrilla faction, during which nine magistrates of the Supreme Court and its 
president were killed. See Colombian Drug Trafficking and Control: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. 
on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 100th Cong. 1 (1987) (statement of the Honorable Charles B. Rangel). As a 
consequence, the drug prosecutors were given anonymity, becoming "faceless." 1999 COUNTRY REPORT, supra 
note 156; Nagle, supra note 152, at 13 1; Esquirol, supra note 156, at 36 n.56; Nagle, supra note 152, at 867. The 
bribery or intimidation of judges and prosecutors has been commonplace. See generally id. at 863-65; Kavas, 
supra note 32, at 492. The faceless courts were subject to serious abuse since everyone but the accused was 
anonymous and the courts were closed to the public. For a description of the courts, see Weiner, supra note 173. 
Although the system has recently been modified, see High  commissioner'.^ Report, supra note 174, 7 223, when 
Tafur's sister was called to give testimony under oath to the prosecutors, she testified to a screen and through a 
microphone system. 
321. See Eric Pianin & Helen Dewar, COP, White House Clear Hurdle on Colombia Involvement, WASH. 
POST, June 28, 2000, at A4, available at LEXIS, General News; Alan Fram, Kosovo Emergency Bill Worked On, 
Associated Press, June 27, 2000, available at LEXIS, Wires; Ariana Huffington, Colombia Chopper Wars, Ariana 
Online (June 26, 2000), at www.ariannaonline.com/columns/files/0626OO.html (on file with author). At the time 
of Victor Tafur's arrest, Congress was considering passage of the Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001 : 
Fiscal Year 2000 Supplemental Appropriations. It was later signed into law by President Clinton on July 13, 
2000. Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001: Fiscal Year 2000 Supplemental Appropriations, Pub. L. 
No. 106-246,2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (1 14 Stat. 51 1) 435. 
322. 1999 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 156. 
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In the United States, special prosecutors are selected by a panel of three federal judges.323 
In Colombia, the special prosecutor is chosen by the Colombian Supreme Court from three 
candidates proposed by the president.324 In Tafur's case, the special prosecutor was of a 
different party than both the president of Colombia and Tafur and had strong political ties to 
the previous president.325 Given those facts, the possibility emerges that the treatment of 
Tafur may have been less than balanced. 
Certainly, the strong possibility exists that if Tafur were returned to Colombia, his life 
would be in jeopardy and the government would likely be unable to protect him.326 To 
return him under such conditions would constitute a denial of due process327 and a violation 
of human rights norms. But even in light of such strong evidence, the extradition magistrate 
refused to look behind the extradition request and consider the circumstances that might 
have fostered it or the conditions that Tafur would face if returned to Colombia. The court 
relied instead on the "rule of non-inquiry," finding that such considerations were for the 
executive, not the 
H. Human Rights Law and the Tafur Extradition Proceeding 
As noted earlier, human rights law embodied in ratified treaties is a part of the law of 
the land under the Constitution of the United States; furthermore, human rights law is 
superior to, and controlling over, extradition treaties under public international law. But 
even if a court is not bound by international law,329 it can look to those precepts when 
determining whether procedures are fundamentally fair and When examined in light 
323. 28 U.S.C. 5 49 (2000). 
324. 1999 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 156. 
325. The former president, Ernesto Samper, was accused of taking money from narcotraffickers to finance 
his 1994 campaign for president. Members of his administration were convicted and imprisoned, and Samper was 
impeached, but not convicted. The United States nevertheless withdrew his visa. Esquirol, supra note 156, at 3 1- 
32. 
326. Based on these facts Tafur sought asylum in the United States on May 10, 2000. Application for 
Asylum and Withholding of Removal, In re Tafur-Dominguez (File No. A077 626 394) (INS May 10, 2000). As 
of January 2002, the INS had not rendered a decision. 
327. Even if Tafur's life somehow could have been protected upon his extradition, a real punishment would 
nonetheless have been inflicted simply by the fact of extradition. Regardless of whether he were later exonerated 
in Colombia, it is probable that the Immigration and Naturalization Service would deny Tafur the opportunity to 
return to the United States to continue his post-graduate studies because he had been arrested and extradited. 
Tafur would have lost his year of study of environmental law, and his tuition and dormitory fees. His attempt to 
build a new career for himself in environmental law would have been frustrated. Extradition in this case would 
not merely be doing Colombia's bidding, but would be extracting a significant penalty from a person presumed by 
law to be innocent. 
The amici proposed "one way to accommodate the need of the Colombian government's Public Prosecutor to 
investigate allegations against Victor Tafur according to its national procedures, while avoiding irreparable harm 
to his human rights, and the infliction of extra-judicial penalties, would be to release Victor Tafur with the 
understanding that he would agree to submit to interrogation by the Colombian Special Prosecutor, at the 
Embassy of the Republic of Colombia in Washington, D.C., or at the Mission of Republic of Colombia at the 
United Nations headquarters in New York City, or even by vidio [sic] tele-conference. Such buildings are 
Colombia territories, and . . . the Special Prosecutor's investigators . . . would be able to conduct their examination 
securely within Colombian territory." Amici Memorandum of Law, supra note 32, at 24-25. 
328. Hearing (Apr. 13,2000), supra note 162, at 19. 
329. Some courts have found customary international law controlling. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. 
Wikinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981). Others have refused to apply it when it conflicted with a 
domestic statute. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (I lth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986). 
330. Courts have recognized the effect that evolving international human rights norms can have in shaping 
our own standards of due process. In considering the question of indeterminate detention of an alien without bail, 
the court in Caballero v. Caplinger, 9 14 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (E.D. La. 1996), looked to international documents 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention. Similarly, the court in Lareau 
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of international human rights norms, the provisional detention and limitations on evidence in 
the Tafur proceeding are problematic. But the rule of non-inquiry is especially troublesome 
considering the facts of this case. Since Colombia's troubled civil and political conditions 
are well-known, and the threats to Victor Tafur's life were real and continuing, the 
extradition court should have followed the human rights precedents of other tribunals 
outside the federal court system, which deny extradition on facts similar to those in the 
Tafur case. 
Other tribunals have applied human rights norms in situations analogous to* these. The 
state that expels or extradites a person may not violate the human rights of a potential 
extraditee in doing so. Even if the extraditing state is observing the person's human rights 
in its own territory, that state may not extradite an individual if it would subject the person 
to "a real risk" that his human rights would be violated.331 
The threatened violation of Victor Tafur's human rights, had he been extradited to 
Colombia, could have occurred, not because someone influencing the government wanted 
such an event, but because the government could not prevent it. Murder by drug cartel 
agents is too often a reality in Colombia. And under international law, the ultimate 
responsibility lies with the state of Colombia, even if the action is due to private 
individuals.332 This principle has been recognized in the United States in non-extradition 
v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980), affd in part, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981), considered 
the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 217, when reviewing claims of constitutionally 
inadequate conditions in a local prison. The court noted that adoption of the standards by international bodies did 
not necessarily render them applicable in the case before the court, but constituted "an authoritative international 
statement of basic norms of human dignity. . . . The standards embodied in this statement are relevant to the 
'canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice' embodied in the Due Process Clause." 
Lareuu, 507 F. Supp. at 1188 n.9. 
33 1. See CNZ Varas v. Sweden, App. No. 15576189, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1992) (court report) (stating that 
deportation of a person who faced a "real threat" of inhumane treatment in the receiving state is a violation of 
human rights, although the court found in this case that there was no "real threat"). In Maroufidou v. Sweden, the 
UN Human Rights Commission upheld Sweden's right to expel a woman to Greece, but Sweden did have to 
present evidence to the tribunal as to her security in Greece in the face of allegations that she would likely be 
"harassed and even physically attacked by persons she assumed to be right-wing extremists." Selected Decisions 
Under the Optional Protocol, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 12th Sess., Comm. No. 5811979, at 80, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/l (1990). In Vijayanathan v. France, App. Nos. 17550/90 and 17825191, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 62 
(1992), France was obliged to enquire into claims that if persons were returned to Sri Lanka, where a civil war was 
in progress not unlike the situation in Colombia, their human rights would be compromised because of their Tamil 
ethnic background. Several European courts have refused to extradite persons to the United States when the 
accused would face the death penalty as a possible punishment. See, e.g., Venezia v. Ministero di Grazia e 
Giustizia. Sentence No. 2232-1996 (Italian Const. Ct., June 27, 1996); Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
14038188, 1 1  Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989). 
332. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights states this clearly in Judgement in Velasquez Rodriguez 
Case (Forced Disappearance and Death of Individual in Honduras), Case 7920 (July 29, 1988), 28 I.L.M. 291, 326 
(1989), in which it explains that a state has an affirmative duty not only to refrain from official acts which might 
directly violate the extradited individual's human rights, but to exercise due diligence to protect him from the acts 
of others. 
Thus, in principle, any violation of rights recognized by the Convention [International Convention on 
Human Rights or recognized by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, supra] canied out by an 
act of public authority or by persons who use their position of authority is imputable to the State. 
However, this does not define all the circumstances in which a State is obligated to prevent, 
investigate and punish human rights violations, nor all the cases in which the State might be found 
responsible for an infringement of those rights. An illegal act which violates human rights and which 
is initially not directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a privatc pcrson or 
because the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility of the 
State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or 
to respond to it as required by the Convention. 
Heinonline - -  37 Tex. Int'l L.J. 319 2002 
proceedings. For example, the Board of Immigration Appeals refused to return a woman to 
Togo because of well-founded fears that she would risk genital mutilation.333 The Board 
held that human rights violations "can consist of the infliction of harm or suffering by a 
government, or persons a government is unwilling or unable to 
Accordingly, before a federal court can extradite an individual, it must examine the 
factual and legal assurances that his human rights will be protected. In Victor Tafur's case, 
the court should have inquired into the situation in Colombia, which, in light of conditions 
in,that country, would have provided ample evidence for it to conclude that the governments 
of Colombia and the United States could not guarantee Tafur's safety if extradited. Since 
his human rights could not be protected, the court could appropriately have refused to 
extradite him on those grounds. 
I. The Cumulative Effect of the Government's Actions 
The extradition process contains a number of discrete steps, all of which have 
implications for the rights and liberties of the accused. Similarly, all of the steps may have 
implications for the government, and it is up to the extraditing judge to assure that a balance 
is struck by which both the interests of the government and the rights of the accused are 
protected. By any rational evaluation, extradition is a criminal proceeding, and the 
standards of domestic criminal proceedings, as well as international human rights precepts, 
should inform the process. In the United States we have developed strong constitutionally 
based protections for those accused of crimes, and those norms should not be 
unquestioningly transgressed because of foreign-policy concerns. Instead, notions of due 
process and findamental fairness should always guide the court. While it is tempting (and 
lawyerly) to review. a particular case issue-by-issue and to determine at each isolated step 
whether an individual's rights have been violated, in the end the court should also consider 
the case as a whole to determine whether the process has-been both fair and just. When the 
Tafur case is examined in this light, the lack of fundamental fairness is apparent. 
Although Victor Tafur is a foreign national, he is nonetheless entitled to the same 
constitutional protections as are citizens of the United He is presumed innocent 
and must be treated as such. To be deprived of his liberty or property, probable cause must 
be demonstrated.336 In the proceedings against him, he must be given the opportunity to 
defend himself and, to some extent, the opportunity to challenge the evidence presented by 
the government.337 Yet he was arrested and taken into custody on a warrant that did not 
demonstrate probable cause, and his house and dormitory room were searched pursuant to 
another warrant, no more supportable than the first. He was denied release (even though the 
judge questioned the substance of the case) and held for six weeks in a prison with 
convicted felons. When finally released, he was under house arrest, severely restricted in 
his movements. His attorney was refused discovery, and at the extradition hearing Tafur 
was not allowed to produce evidence to challenge that presented by the government. 
Moreover, Tafur faced the very real prospect of being returned to Colombia as a prisoner, 
where his legal rights, not to mention his life and safety, could not be assured. Although the 
Id. at 326, 7 172. Further, the court continues, the "duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political, 
administrative and cultural nature that promote the protection of human rights and ensure that any violations are 
considered and treated as illegal acts." Id. at 325, fl 175. 
333. In re Fauziya Kasinga, File A73 476 695, Interim Decision 3278, 1996 BIA LEXlS 15, at *19 (Bd. 
Immig. App., June 13, 1996). 
334. Id. 
335. U.S. v. Lambera-Camorlinge, 206 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 2000). 
336. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
337. Id. amend. V. 
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judge, in the end, declined to issue a certificate of extraditability, T a h r  was not, and could 
not be, made whole for injuries resulting from the flawed extradition process. He suffered 
imprisonment, impairment of his health, damage to his reputation, and substantial financial 
costs. The extradition process in Tafur's case resulted in fundamental unfairness; allowing 
such instances of unfairness to continue not only ignores the rights of detainees, but 
undermines the trust of our own citizens in the process.338 
VI. CONCLUSION: ENSURING JUSTICE-OPTIONS FOR JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
AND LEGISLATIVE R FORM 
The law that governs extradition in the modem United States was once modern 
itself-one hundred and twenty years ago.339 In the ensuing years, the face of our nation has 
changed, as well as its connections with the larger global community. Where once we stood 
far removed from most other nations, isolated by distance and the difficulty of voyaging, 
now travelers-visitors, tourists, immigrants-are whisked to and from foreign shores in 
hours. U.S. citizens, from children to seniors, trot fearlessly to the farthest reaches of the 
globe, and many of our residents and citizens are considerably more bi-national than at any 
time in our past, with one foot in the United States and another in their country of origin. 
Modem transportation and modern rnodes of communication make the world a web of 
tightly-linked and interdependent nation states. There are literally hundreds of treaties, 
conventions, and agreements that bind groups of nations. As European integration 
progresses, as the North American Free Trade Agreement takes effect, and as other similar 
processes occur around the globe, national borders become less distinct. At the same time, 
global standards of human rights, now increasingly accompanied by a growing belief that 
we are indeed our brothers' keepers (even if those brothers are foreign nationals), create 
new rights for individuals and impose new duties on national governments. No longer will 
the public remain unaware of the significance of some of our rendition procedures, since the 
individual who is interviewed by the press in a U.S. prison today may be on national news 
tomorrow before a foreign tribunal that may offer a brand of justice somewhat deficient in 
its appreciation of human rights norms. The changed world circumstances are profound, 
338. Elements of Tafur's arrest and incarceration also raise issues concerning the presumption of innocence. 
The presumption of innocence is recognized in Article 1 l(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and is 
contained also in Article 14(2) of the ICCPR, supra note 114, at 176; ratified by the United States Senate and in 
force since August 9, 1992, and ratified also by Colombia. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH~ible/englishinternetbible/pachapter/treaty5.asp. The right is again set forth 
in Article 8(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights. American Convention, supra note 118, at 147. 
Amici for Tafur argued that Tafur was denied the presumption of innocence when he was detained provisionally 
pursuant to the extradition treaty even when there was no urgency, and then denied bail. Amici Memorandum of 
Law, supru note 32, at 29. Because the presumption of innocence must be observed by all public authorities, the 
U.S. Departments of State and Justice and the Drug Enforcement Administration also had a duty to refrain from 
pre-judging the outcome of a criminal investigation or trial. See Manfred Nowak, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS CCPR COMMENTARY 254, para. 36 (1993). Tafur arguably was denied the presumption of 
innocence since he was "tried" in the newspapers when DEA agents boasted of his capture and announced the 
prospect that he would be the first drug trafficker extradited from the United States to Colombia under the 
Extradition Treaty. See, e.g., Jonathan Bandler, Suspect Led Quiet Life On Campus, THE JOURNALNEWS, Mar. 8, 
2000, at IB; S. Cohen, Cocaine Smuggling Charged, T H E  JOURNAL NEWS (Westchester County, N.Y.), Mar. 7, 
2000, at IA. They hrther argued that these allegations had had a chilling effect on the academic community at 
Tafur's law school, and intimidated many from inquiring further into the facts surrounding Tafur's arrest, and 
from assisting in his defense, all in violation of accepted standards of human rights. Amici Memorandum of Law, 
supra note 32, at 29. 
339. The last substantial legislative changes to the extradition statute, 18 U.S.C. 4 3181-95, were in 1882. 
H.R. REP. NO. 98-998, at 2 (1984). 
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and the extradition procedures that were once appropriate no longer serve the interests of 
justice in today's world. 
There have been attempts to amend the extradition laws in the last twenty years; none 
however, have been successful.340 The Department of Justice supported some proposed 
revisions to clarify the process. But, in order to guarantee that the fundamental human 
rights of an extraditee are protected, reforms must be comprehensive.341 Although 
important considerations of foreign policy and international comity must be recognized and 
accommodated, the reforms should be focused on assuring the rights of the individual. 
It has been noted above that current extraditions take place under a patchwork of 
and multilateral treaties. While the frameworks of most of the treaties are 
similar, the details may vary substantially. Some treaty provisions may differ in scope but 
not nature, others may have major substantive implications. The US.-Sweden Extradition 
Treaty, for example, stipulates that there may be no extradition if sending the accused to the 
requesting state would be inconsistent with humanitarian  consideration^.^^^ Moreover, if a 
treaty differs from the federal extradition statute and post-dates it, which most do, then the 
treaty controls. With the increased number of extraditions, not to mention the increased 
number of nations, this situation should be rationalized with a statute that gives clear 
directives to the executive and the courts on both substantive and procedural matters, 
supplemented as necessary by treaty provisions.344 
Unfortunately, no matter how much a wholesale revision of the extradition statute may 
be warranted, there has been little interest in such an undertaking since the 1980 efforts. 
340. The last major efforts at amendment were in the early 1980s. There were strong proponents of reform 
on Capitol Hill, and substantial progress was made toward revamping the law, but certain issues proved 
intractable and the efforts foundered. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 128 (2nd Cir. 1981) (bill developed with 
Justice and State Departments to modernize extradition laws); see also Shea, supra note 142, at 91-92 nn.27-34 
(for citations to various proposed bills amending the extradition statute, their accompanying congressional 
debates, and a brief discussion of their impacts upon the executive and judicial role in the extradition process); 
Kester, supra note 28, at 1442; Tracey Hughes, Comment: Extradition Reform: The Role of the Judiciary in 
Protecting the Rights of a Requested Individual, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 293 (1986) (for an analysis of 
legislative attempts to reform the extradition statute and their potential impacts on the judiciary). See gerterally 
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Extradition Reform Legislation in the UnitedStates: 1981-1983, 17 AKRON L. REV. 495 
(1 984) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Extradition Reform] (for a complete analysis of legislative attempts to reform the 
extradition statute between 1981-83). 
341. The legislation proposed by the House Judiciary Committee in 1984 would have made substantial 
changes in existing law, the most important of which were: setting standards for release pending hearing; 
codifying the "political offense" exception; eliminating the "rule of non-inquiry"; and allowing either party to 
appeal the extradition magistrate's ruling. The bill also permitted extmdition requests to be filed only in federal 
court; required the Attorney General to act as the complainant; permitted the issuance of an arrest warrant when 
the whereabouts of the party were unknown 18 U.S.C. 5 3 184 requires the warrant to be filed where the requested 
party is found); provided for issuance of a summons to commence proceedings instead of a warrant; established a 
right to counsel and authorized the appointment of counsel for indigent accused; and codified the "dual 
criminality" rule. H.R. REP. NO. 98-998 at 7-8 (1984) (report accompanying H.R. 3347). Section 3192(a)(2) of 
the proposed legislation circumscribed the government's ability to file additional requests after denial of 
extradition. Id. at 47. The bill was opposed by the Department of Justice. See Bassiouni, Extradition Reform, 
supra note 340, at 496 n.8. 
342. The United States apparently does not avail itself of multilateral treaties, relying instead on individually 
negotiated bilateral treaties. See Bassiouni, Extradition Reform, supra note 340, at 508. 
343. Convention on Extradition, Oct. 24, 1961, U.S.-Swed., 14 U.S.T. 1845, 1849 (entered into force Dec. 
3, 1963) [hereinafter U.S.-Sweden Extradition Treaty]. The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances provides that "the requested State may refuse to comply with such 
requests where there are substantial grounds leading its judicial or other competent authorities to believe that 
compliance would facilitate the prosecution or punishment of any person on account of his race, religion, 
nationality or political opinions, or would cause prejudice for any of those reasons to any person affected by the 
request." U.N. ESCOR, UN Doc. E/CONF.82/15 (1998), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 497, 497 (1989), available at 
http://www.incb.org/e/ind-conv.htm. 
344. See Bassiouni, Extradition Reform, supra note 340, at 505-06. 
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Moreover, in today's political climate, with a large U.S. stake in bringing terrorists as well 
as foreign drug-traffickers to the United States to face trial, it seems unlikely that 
overhauling the extradition laws to expand the protections of accused individuals would 
gamer much support in either the executive or legislative branch.345 Meanwhile, courts 
continue to grapple with a growing number of extraditions-without uniformity of results. 
Accordingly, at least some changes to the present statutory scheme should be considered. 
Several human rights violations in the Tafur case should be addressed in any reform 
proposal: (1) the question of provisional detention without bail; (2) the scope of evidentiary 
rights at the hearing, especially the rule of non-contradiction; and (3) the rule of non- 
inquiry. Without revisions to existing law in all of these areas, the process will remain 
seriously flawed.346 
As to provisional detention, obviously it is necessary for law enforcement officers to 
move with dispatch and to seize an accused whenever he is found. It is also necessary to 
detain that individual until a hearing occurs and a court can review the grounds for 
detention. But once the matter has been brought before the court, the calculus changes. In 
both an extradition proceeding and a domestic criminal matter the court seeks to assure the 
future presence of the accused. The only real distinction is that, in an extradition hearing, 
the failure of the accused to appear has ramifications outside of the particular proceeding. 
Since the United States may be unable to comply with the surrender request, fiture treaty 
partners may, in turn, fail to honor subsequent U.S. requests.347 This particular factor is the 
primary one upon which the government has based its resistance to release and underlay its 
rejection of attempts to amend the extradition statute in the 1 9 8 0 s . ~ ~ ~  Those amendments 
did not apply the Bail Reform A C ~ ~ ~ ~  to extradition matters but, instead, created a procedure 
designed to apply provisions of the Act selectively,350 thereby attempting to address the 
Justice Department's concerns regarding pre-hearing release. The bill required that the 
extraditee be held for ten days, unless he could prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that he did not present a substantial risk of flight or a danger to the community.351 
Thereafter, the detention could be extended in ten-day increments on a showing of good 
cause by the In a bow to the Department of Justice, the legislation specified 
that in considering release the court "shall take into account whether a relationship with a 
345. There were abortive attempts in 1992-93 after the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), to forbid abduction in lieu of extradition. See International Kidnapping 
and Extradition Treaty Enforcement Act of 1993, H.R. 3346, 103d Cong. (1993); lnternational Kidnapping and 
Extradition Treaty Enforcement Act of 1993, H.R. 5565, 102d Cong. (1992). The only recent congressional 
interest was demonstrated in 1999 when a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives attempting 
primarily to deal with attempts by individuals or foreign nations to thwart U.S. extradition efforts. See 
International Extradition Enforcement Act of 1999, H.R. 3212, 106th Cong. (1999). 
346. The changes considered by Congress in the 1980s were substantial but did not fundamentally alter the 
roles of the executive and the judiciary. See discussion supra notes 34445 .  At least one writer has suggested 
vesting the entire procedure for extraditions with the executive by establishing a system of administrative law 
judges within the Department of State. Bedrick, supra note 27, at 401-02. This suggestion was addressed, 
however, at rectifying any potential separation of powers violations in the current scheme. 
347. H.R. REP. NO. 98-998, at 14-15 (1982) (report accompanying H.R. 3347); H.R. REP. NO. 97-627, at 
35 (1982) (report accompanying H.R. 6046). The only other difference that the congressional committee could 
discern was that in a domestic criminal case the forfeiture of a bond when an accused fails to appear benefits the 
charging state. Id. 
348. See Bassiouni, Extradition Reform, supra note 340, at 496 n.8; see also H.R. REP. NO. 97-627, at 2 
(1 982) (report accompanying H.R. 6046). 
349. 18 U.S.C. $5 3141-50,3156 (2001). 
350. H.R. REP. NO. 98-998, at 15. 
35 1. Essentially the standards of the Bail Reform Act. See id. 
352. Id. at 15-18,4849. 
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foreign state will be jeopardized with respect to a treaty concerning extradition."353 The 
balancing of the individual liberty of the detainee against the foreign policy interests of the 
state certainly raises troubling constitutional questions, but the court need only "take into 
account" the state's interest.354 Moreover, the courts presently undertake this balancing on 
an ad hoc basis without guidance from the legislature. 
Certainly, the government can face serious difficulties in handling extradition requests 
for a foreign nation, especially for the many nations whose systems are not based on the 
common law model. Language differences further complicate the matter. The Tafur case 
amply demonstrates the unusual problems that may plague assistant U.S. attorneys in 
dealing with an unfamiliar system. However, the Department of Justice maintains an entire 
section devoted to international affairs and has developed expertise in this area.35s And as 
the Tafur case demonstrates, deadlines force action. Moreover, modem means of 
communication make instantaneous, global communication a reality. It may have required 
sixty days in the time of sailing ships to secure information, but we live in the information 
age with facsimile machines and the Internet. If modem business can carry out complicated 
commercial transactions in compressed time frames, there is no reason to expect less of our 
government when human liberty is at stake. 
Basic tenets of constitutionally mandated protections must The United 
States argues that an international extradition procedure is not a criminal case and that, as a 
result, the Bail Reform Act is not applicable.357 The government relies on a long line of 
cases holding that bail is presumptively not available and may be granted only when special 
circumstances are present. But an unconvicted detainee is presumed innocent under both 
U.S. law and international law. The Fifth Amendment's mandate that "no person shall 
be . . . deprived o f .  . . liberty . . . without due process of law"358 should mean that an 
individual detained for an extradition hearing receives no less of a guarantee of freedom 
than one detained for domestic criminal prosecution. 
The formal extradition hearing is the crucial point in an extradition procedure, yet one 
at which the current extradition law may seriously hamper the detainee's ability to 
adequately present a case. Obviously, the hearing is not intended to be a trial on the merits 
of the requesting nation's charges. It is a determination that sufficient reason exists to 
believe that the detainee has committed an extraditable offense and should be surrendered 
for prosecution or imprisonment. Thus, the comparison of the scope of the extradition 
hearing to a preliminary hearing in a domestic criminal case is realistic.359 Indeed, the 
353. Id. at 49. 
354. Id. 
355. See Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 818-19. 
356. Although bail has traditionally been restricted in extradition cases, courts have begun to question the 
constitutionality of such detention. The Ninth Circuit in Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997) 
broke firmly with prior case law, holding that the detention without a demonstrated risk of flight violated the Due 
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The constitutionality of refusing bail when no such risk is shown has also 
been questioned by commentators. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Hall, Note, A Recommended Approach to Bail in 
International Extradition Cases, 86 MICH. L. REV. 599,618-19 (1987). 
357. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Bail, at 2, In re Tafur-Dominguez, No. 00-154-M 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2000) (relying upon United States v. Hills, 765 F. Supp. 381, 385 n.5 (E.D. Mich. 1991); 
Kamrin v. United States, 725 F.2d 1225, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 (1984)). The 
government contends that the definition of offense in the Act limits its application to domestic crimes. 
358. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
359. A preliminary examination is not constitutionally mandated, but the requirement for one is established 
by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3060, and rule, FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c). Under U.S. law a preliminary hearing to determine 
whether probable cause for an arrest exists must be held within ten days following initial appearance if the 
defendant is in custody, otherwise within twenty days. Whether the arrest was made pursuant to a warrant is not a 
factor. See 18 U.S.C. 5 3060. For a comparison of preliminary hearings to extradition hearings, see Marston, 
supra note 16, at 361-63. 
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extradition hearing is even more procedurally significant, since once it is complete the 
court's role ends and constitutional provisions no longer can be guaranteed.360 That being 
so, the reasons for not affording an extraditee the same rights available in a domestic 
criminal case must be closely scrutinized. If one of the primary reasons that we strive to 
comply with a foreign request is to ensure that we will not be hampered in enforcing our 
own laws, then it seems counter-intuitive to undercut our own domestic laws by refusing to 
afford established legal protections to an extraditee-who, in some cases, may himself be a 
U.S. citizen. This applies not only to the hearing itself, but also to discovery prior to the 
hearing. There is no obvious reason not to afford an extraditee the same level of discovery 
that a domestic federal pretrial detainee would be afforded. Realistically, providing 
comparable discovery would place little burden on the prosecutor since pretrial discovery in 
a domestic federal criminal case is limited.361 
At a preliminary hearing the government's evidence may be based in whole or in part 
on hearsay,362 but the defendant has the right to examine whatever witnesses are presented 
and to offer evidence in his own defense.363 The defendant may also have a limited right to 
subpoena witnesses who could present evidence to negate probable cause.364 The 
extradition statute makes no similar provisions, but, as noted earlier, courts have fashioned 
rules to permit the introduction of evidence. The rule of non-contradiction seeks to avoid 
requiring the requesting nation to be put to its proof in the court of the asylum state. Yet if 
applied strictly, especially in combination with other evidentiary restrictions, the rule can 
work severe hardship. Government witnesses or evidence of questionable credibility has to 
be taken at face value while the defendant's evidence is barred. Under the rule, for 
example, a defendant with clear proof of innocence, perhaps witnesses who could verify his 
presence in the United States at the time of the crime committed in the requesting country, 
would be barred from presenting that testimony because it contradicts the government's 
evidence. Yet it would be unlikely that the defendant would be able to produce these 
witnesses in the foreign nation if extradited. The fundamental unfairness and due process 
implications of such situations have led some courts to develop further refinements on the 
rule, allowing contradictory evidence if it "completely negates" or "obliterates" probable 
cause.365 Such a standard, however, provides little more guidance to courts than the 
"explanatory-contradictory" dichotomy. 
One writer has proposed refining the rule of non-contradiction by creating a summary 
judgment standard, which would allow the court to admit evidence if no reasonable fact 
finder could disagree with it.366 The standard is designed t o  allow a court to accept 
360. See Michael E .  O'Neill, Article III and the Process Due a Connecticut Yankee Before King Arthur's 
Court, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 17,49-5 1 (1 992). 
361. Discovery is confined mainly to providing a summary of the facts against the defendant, any of his own 
statements, and physical evidence. FED. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l). The government must produce the statement of a 
witness who testifies at a preliminary hearing, but not until after the testimony is given. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.l(d), 
26.2. Certainly any exculpatory material should be disclosed. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
362. FED.R.CRIM.P .~ . I (~ ) .  
363. Id. 
364. An accused may be entitled to subpoena a witness under certain circumstances. Ross v. Sirica, 380 
F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (showing by the accused that witnesses are material to the issue of probable cause, 
requests for subpoenas should be granted). 
365. See, e.g., In re Gonzalez, 52 F .  Supp. 2d 725 (W.D. La. 1999); Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 
F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
366. It was suggested that the appropriate standard for considering whether to admit evidence is not whether 
it is explanatory or contradictory, but whether "the accused's evidence is such that no reasonable fact finder could 
disagree with i t .  . . even if it provides a defense to the charges or contradicts evidence presented by the requesting 
government." Semmelman, Non-Contradiction, supra note 48, at 1302. This is similar to the standard used in 
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"unimpeachable" evidence, such as a fully documented alibi, but the instances in which the 
evidence is of such caliber are likely to be relatively The legislation proposed by the 
Judiciary Committee in the 1980s took a broader approach. It reiterated existing law that 
the guilt or innocence of the party was not before the court, but allowed the accused to 
introduce evidence concerning issues that were before the Such a standard leaves 
much room for interpretation since probable cause is before the court and refuting probable 
cause raises issues of guilt and innocence. A better approach would be to allow courts to 
accept evidence from an accused when to reject it would lead to fundamental unfairness. 
Thus, if the evidence proffered by the accused is of the type that would be substantially 
more difficult to procure in the requesting state, such as alibi witnesses located in the United 
States, the court should allow its admission. The court would then consider it, along with 
other evidence, to determine whether it met the traditional test for probable cause (i.e., 
evidence that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the accused had committed 
the alleged offense). This is essentially a due process standard, which leaves a court free to 
exercise its judgment on the nature of evidence to be accepted. While it does not provide a 
bright line, it is the type of discretion that courts already exercise on a regular basis. 
The third key area in need of reform is the rule of non-inquiry. Ignoring the potential 
for serious deprivations of human rights, should an individual be surrendered, would make 
the court complicit in these violations.369 It may not only violate the due process rights of 
the individual, but it can erode the confidence of U.S. citizens in the judiciary. The 
Judiciary Committee draft would have eliminated the rule of non-inquiry and placed an 
affirmative duty on the court to inquire into allegations of human rights abuse once raised by 
the extraditee. If the individual established by a preponderance of the evidence the 
likelihood of being subjected to hndamental unfairness, the court would not extradite.370 
The statute did not provide guidance as to what might constitute fundamental unfairness, but 
left that determination to the court. Based on the legislative history, it appears that the 
drafters intended to eliminate the "shocking to the conscience" standard and provide more 
flexibility to the court.371 
One scholar with extensive experience in extradition matters has suggested that the 
rule of non-inquiry be abandoned and that, instead, the courts should first determine whether 
the requesting and asylum countries have professed a commitment to basic human rights 
principles.372 If so, the court in the requested state would be allowed to weigh the evidence 
presented by the extraditee to demonstrate that he would be subjected to persecution, denial 
of a fair trial, or other human rights violations in the requesting nation. Extradition should 
then be denied unless adequate assurances could be provided that such threats would not be 
realized. Courts in the United States routinely make such judgments regarding conditions in 
civil cases for deciding a motion for summary judgment. Id. While this seems a reasonable approach upon first 
consideration, it is not clear that it provides any clearer demarcation than the current rule. Id. at 1301-02. 
367. In Moghadam, for instance, the issue was whether the recantation by the government's primary witness 
could be introduced by the extraditee. The court ruled that it could. Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. at 783. 
368. H.R. REP. NO. 98-998, at 14,51 (1982). 
369. Relying on the executive to protect the right of the individual is problematic. As Judge Weinstein 
noted in Ahmad v. Wigen, "immediate political, military or economic needs of the United States [may] induce the 
State Department to ignore the rights of the accused." Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389,415 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), 
a f d ,  91 0 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990). 
370. H.R. REP. NO. 98-998, at 4,6,52,60 (1982). 
371. H.R. REP. NO. 98-998, at 6. One writer has suggested that an extraditee be allowed to present evidence 
of potential abuse or persecution if surrendered. In the face of a suficiently strong showing, the court should then 
evaluate the treatment against human rights norms. If the likely treatment violated these norms, the court should 
refuse to extradite unless the requesting state provided adequate assurances that the surrendered party would be 
treated fairly. Shea, supra note 142, at 126. The difficulty with such an approach is, of course, that there is no 
way to assure that the requesting country lives up to its guarantees. 
372. Wilson, Non-Inquiry, supra note 13, at 753, 765. 
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other countries in asylum cases, and it would not be a major step to allow it in extradition 
cases.373 This scholar suggests that, in a situation in which the requesting country does not 
accept basic human rights norms, the country of asylum should look to customary 
international human rights norms to determine its legal obligations.374 The ICCPR could 
provide the framework for determining whether treatment violated human rights norms.375 
While this appears to be a workable proposal, the difficulty lies in enforcing any assurances 
offered by the requesting party.376 For that reason, it seems simpler and equally efficient to 
allow the courts to make the same judgments as they are accustomed to making in an asylum 
case. 
In conclusion, there are numerous flaws in present extradition law that call for a major 
revamping of extradition procedures and practices. While some of this can be accomplished 
through continuing judicial construction of standards and precedents, a better approach 
would be to enact legislative changes along the lines proposed by the Judiciary Committee 
over fifteen years ago. The changes were due then-they are well overdue now. 
373. As Wilson points out, in both Switzerland and Austria, extradition will not be countenanced if the 
requesting state does not observe basic human rights standards. Id. at 765. 
374. Id. at 753 n.4. 
375. Id. at 761. 
376. Id. at 758-59. Unfortunately, there is little way to enforce those assurances, except by refusing 
subsequent requests. See Shea, supra note 142, at 130 nn.255-58. 
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